Look What They\u27ve Done to My Tort, Ma: The Unfortunate Demise of  Abuse of Process  in Maryland by Utermohle, Jeffrey J.
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 32
Issue 1 Fall 2002 Article 2
2002
Look What They've Done to My Tort, Ma: The
Unfortunate Demise of "Abuse of Process" in
Maryland
Jeffrey J. Utermohle
University of Baltimore School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Torts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Utermohle, Jeffrey J. (2002) "Look What They've Done to My Tort, Ma: The Unfortunate Demise of "Abuse of Process" in Maryland,"
University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 32: Iss. 1, Article 2.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol32/iss1/2
LOOK WHAT THEY'VE DONE TO MY TORT, MA: 
THE UNFORTUNATE DEMISE OF "ABUSE OF 
PROCESS" IN MARYLAND 
By Jeffrey J. Utermohlet 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When litigants flagrantly misuse the "tools of litigation" (e.g., mo-
tions, subpoenas, or discovery) for ulterior purposes, justice requires 
imposing tort liability for "abuse of process." Otherwise, scoffiaws may 
use coercive tactics with impunity, thereby threatening the integrity of 
the judicial process and unfairly disadvantaging opponents. Unfortu-
nately, in Maryland, most victims of blatant litigation misconduct have 
no tort remedy because the state's highest court eviscerated the vener-
able tort of abuse of process in One Thousand Fleet Ltd. Partnership v. 
Guerriero. l As one commentator stated: 
t B.S., Journalism, 1984, University of Maryland, College Park;J.D., 1987, and 
Law Review Member, University of Baltimore School of Law. Former 
Judicial Law Clerk to the Honorable Harry A. Cole, Court of Appeals of 
Maryland. Adjunct Writing Professor, University of Baltimore School of 
Law. Member, Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos, P.C. 
l. 346 Md. 29, 694 A.2d 952 (1997). One Thousand Fleet involved a dispute 
between a real estate developer, One Thousand Fleet Limited Partnership 
("Fleet"), and a property owners group including John Guerriero and the 
Little Italy Community Organization (collectively, "the Guerriero group"). 
The dispute arose from Fleet's proposed conversion of the Bagby Furniture 
Warehouse into a 57-unit apartment building located in Baltimore's his-
toric Little Italy neighborhood. [d. at 32, 694 A.2d at 953. In April 1993, 
Fleet agreed with the Bagby Furniture Company ("Bagby") to purchase the 
warehouse for one million dollars. [d. at 33, 694 A.2d at 954. Thereafter, 
Fleet secured zoning approvals from the Baltimore City Board of Municipal 
and Zoning Appeals (the "Board"). [d. Fleet then obtained state and local 
funding, a condition of which required Fleet to reserve ten apartment units 
for persons of moderate income. [d. at 33-34, 694 A.2d at 954. Subse-
quently, in April 1995, John Guerriero offered Bagby $300,000 cash to 
purchase the warehouse, but Bagby rejected that offer and later completed 
the sale to Fleet. [d. at 34, 694 A.2d at 954. Meanwhile, members of the 
Guerriero group had challenged the zoning approvals in Baltimore City 
Circuit Court (hereinafter "the Zoning Lawsuit"), and Fleet intervened. [d. 
at 34-35, 694 A.2d at 954-55. After the trial court dismissed the Zoning 
Lawsuit, the property owners appealed, but the court of special appeals dis-
missed the appeal in December 1995 for lack of prosecution. [d. at 35, 694 
A.2d at 955. Prior to that dismissal, Fleet filed a separate lawsuit (including 
counts for abuse of process and malicious use of process) against the Guer-
riero group, alleging that the Zoning Lawsuit had been filed to interfere 
with Fleet's ability to finance the warehouse purchase, and to facilitate John 
Guerriero's purchase of the property at a reduced price. !d. Fleet blamed 
1 
2 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 32 
[T]he [One Thousand Fleet] court established a definitive 
abuse of process damages standard that will be extremely dif-
ficult for plaintiffs to meet .... Essentially, unless a plaintiff 
who has been the victim of an improper use of process by 
someone with even the worst possible motive can also estab-
lish that he was arrested or suffered a seizure of property, his 
action for abuse of process will fail. 2 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland's decision to eviscerate the tort 
of abuse of process has dire implications for Maryland litigants who 
fall prey to litigation misconduct. For example, consider the plight of 
Black Rock3 Insurance Company employee George "Babe" Ruth,4 
the Zoning Lawsuit for its financing difficulties, delays, and lost rental in-
come, but ultimately the circuit court dismissed the abuse of process and 
malicious use of process claims. Id. at 35-36, 694 A.2d at 955. Fleet ap-
pealed, and the court of appeals granted by-pass certiorari. Id. at 36, 694 
A.2d at 955. In affirming the dismissal, the court acknowledged that the 
Zoning Lawsuit had caused Fleet to lose money, suffer a delay of its project, 
and face increased construction, legal, and financing costs. Id. at 45, 694 
A.2d at 960. The One Thousand Fleet court reasoned, however, that "[w]e 
need not consider whether Fleet properly alleged abuse of process ... be-
cause we hold that Fleet did not allege legally cognizable damages [i.e., an 
arrest or seizure of property]." Id. Compare One Thousand Fleet, 346 Md. at 
29, 694 A.2d at 952 with Powers v. Leno, 509 N.E.2d 46, 48-49 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 1987) (finding that a jury question existed regarding ulterior motive, 
where the evidence showed that the party challenging zoning approvals did 
so to keep the property tied up in litigation until the property owner 
agreed to sell him a strip of land "for a buck." The abuse of process defen-
dant allegedly stated, "[i]f I don't get what I want, I'll make sure these con-
dominiums are never built. I'll delay it in court forever, even if I have to 
spend one million dollars."). 
2. Christopher W. Pate, Recent Decisions: The Maryland Court of Appeals: Clarify-
ing the Elements of Malicious Use of Process and Abuse of Process Claims, 57 MD. L. 
REv. 1039, 1060-61 (1998) (emphasis added); see One Thousand Fleet, 346 
Md. at 45,694 A.2d at 960 (1997) (citing Bartlett v. Christhilf, 69 Md. 219, 
231, 14 A. 518, 522 (1888» ("A cause of action for civil abuse of process in 
Maryland requires that the plaintiff establish that an arrest of the person or 
a seizure of property of the plaintiff resulted from the abuse of process."). 
3. In the American film classic, "Bad Day at Black Rock," (1954) Spencer 
Tracy played a one-armed World War II veteran (John J. Macreedy) who 
visits the isolated Southwestern desert town of Black Rock. See Movie Re-
view, at http://www.filmsite.org/badd3.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2003). 
Macreedy wants to present a posthumous Congressional Medal of Honor 
for heroism to Komoko, the farming father of a Japanese-American war-
time buddy who died saving Macreedy's life on an Italian battlefield. Id. 
But the hostile, paranoid townsfolk of Black Rock harbor a dark secret and 
they give the stranger a cold, intimidating reception. Id. Tracy's perform-
ance in "Bad Day at Black Rock" earned an Academy Award nomination for 
Best Actor. Id. 
4. This example is fictional, but George Herman "Babe" Ruth was real. Born 
in Baltimore, Maryland in 1895, Ruth signed his first professional baseball 
contract in 1914 with the Baltimore Orioles, then members of the Interna-
tional League. See ROBERT W. CREAMER, BABE: THE LEGEND COMES To LIFE 
51-52 (Simon & Schuster 1992). The Babe went on to star as a pitcher for 
the Boston Red Sox (94 wins, 2.28 earned run average, seventeen shutouts) 
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whose courageous anti-discrimination whistle-blowing5 cost his em-
ployer dearly. Stung by Ruth's disloyalty, Black Rock executives vow to 
make his life miserable. The company demotes Ruth, slashes his sal-
ary, and institutes a company-wide "ostracize Ruth" policy. Adding to 
their rancor, Black Rock's corrupt top brass learn that Ruth may pub-
lish evidence of their insider trading improprieties. Suffering an in-
creasingly unbearable work environment, Ruth sues Black Rock, 
alleging constructive wrongful discharge.6 
To avenge Ruth's whistle-blowing, and to coerce him to conceal the 
insider trading evidence, Black Rock officials ask their attorneys to 
"put Ruth into the poorhouse" using ultra-aggressive, scorched-earth 
litigation tactics. 7 Black Rock's legal team zealously proceeds to "pa-
per Ruth to death" with: 
and as a slugging right fielder for the New York Yankees (714 home runs, 
.342 batting average, 123 stolen bases). See TOTAL BASEBALL: THE OFFICIAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASEBALL 1143, 1730 (John Thorn et al. eds., 7th ed. 
2001). To this day, no player has matched the Sultan of Swat's .690 lifetime 
slugging average. Id. at 2295. The Babe's legacy as a national hero was 
exemplified in World War II when Japanese soldiers charged into battle 
against the United States with the cry, "To hell with Babe Ruth!" See gener-
ally ROBERT W. CREAMER, BABE 22 (Simon & Schuster, Penguin Books 
1983). 
5. "Whistleblower" statutes protect employees from retaliation for disclosing 
an employer's wrongdoing. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1596 (6th ed. 
1991). Maryland has three whistleblower protection statutes. See MD. CODE 
ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 5-604(b) (2002) (protecting employees who allege vio-
lations of the Occupational Safety and Health title); MD. ANN. CODE art. 
49B, § 16(f) (1998) (protecting employees who report their employer'S un-
lawful discriminatory practices); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 762 (1996) 
(prohibiting retaliation against employees who report criminal activity to 
law enforcement authorities). 
6. See Diamond v. T. Rowe Price Assocs., 852 F. Supp. 372, 378 (D. Md. 1994) 
(noting that the Fourth Circuit has cautioned that "constructive discharge 
claims must be 'carefully cabined' because they are 'open to abuse by those 
who leave employment of their own accord.' An employee must show that 
his or her employer deliberately made working conditions so intolerable 
that any reasonable persori would have resigned."). 
7. See Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private justice: Legal Practice at War 
With the Profession and Its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 931, 944 (1993). The 
article quotes the American Bar Association's Commission on Professional-
ism, which was established in late 1984, in stating: 
Often, it is clients who ask lawyers to prosecute or defend ... cases 
through "scorched earth" tactics. The lawyer has an obligation to 
the legal system in his capacity as an officer to the court to dissuade 
the client from ... using tactics geared primarily to drain the finan-
cial resources of the other side. 
Id.; see also Daniel J. McAuliffe, Upping the Ante for junkyard Dogs: Should There 
be Liability for Abusive Litigation Tactics?, Bus. L. TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 19. 
The McAuliffe article observes: 
A frequent refrain of lawyers identified as abusing the litigation 
process is "[mly client made me do it." Given that the client who 
insists on the conduct of a "war of attrition" in a litigation setting 
faces abuse-of-process exposure, lawyers representing such a client 
undoubtedly have an obligation to advise the client of that risk. 
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1. Frivolous, dilatory motions;8 
2. Egregiously abusive discovery tactics;9 
3. Improperly used subpoenas;lo and 
Id.; Ralph Nader & Wesley J. Smith, Speeches and Essays: Lawyers' Roles as New 
Attorneys, 80 MARQ. L. REv. 695, 696 (1997). The article notes: 
[In the United States' legal system,] "might" fundamentally means 
"right," [and] individuals seeking justice from the most powerful 
private and public institutions are often crushed under unremit-
ting "scorched earth" litigation tactics of attorneys who are paid 
hundreds of dollars an hour to obfuscate, obstruct, delay, and oth-
erwise transform the pursuit of civil justice into a protracted, ex-
pensive, and inefficient war of attrition. 
Id.; Roger C. Cramton, Lawyer Conduct in the "Tobacco Wars," 51 DEPAUL L. 
REv. 435,435 (2001) (discussing how tobacco company lawyers engaged in 
"strategic and abusive litigation conduct designed to delay trials, obstruct 
discovery of relevant documents, and run up the costs of the plaintiffs' law-
yers who finance these cases"). 
8. See Nienstedt v. Wetzel, 651 P.2d 876, 880-81 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) ("[W]e 
therefore consider as 'processes' of the court for abuse of process purposes, 
the noticing of depositions, the entry of defaults, and the utilization ofvari-
ous motions such as motions to compel production, for protective orders, 
for change of judge, for sanctions and for continuances."). 
9. See Jonathan K. Van Patten & Robert E. Willard, The Limits of Advocacy: A 
Proposal for the Tort of Malicious Defense in Civil Litigation, 35 HAsTINGS LJ. 
891,896 (1984) ("The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
the 1930's and of state discovery statutes after World War II brought 'free 
and open' discovery designed to reduce surprise and gamesmanship in civil 
litigation. But the Rules also brought increased costs and abuses of the 
process."); see also John M. Johnson & G. Edward Cassady III, Frivolous Law-
suits and Defensive Responses to Them - What Relief Is Available?, 36 ALA. L. REv. 
927, 940 (1985) ("The most commonly abused processes in civil litigation 
are discovery mechanisms."); Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, The State of 
justice, 70 A.B.A.J. 62, 65 (1984) (criticizing attorneys who exploit discovery 
as a "tool of extortion"). 
10. See generally Bd. of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, Local 
1889,343 N.E.2d 278 (N.Y. 1975). In this case, the complaint stated a cause 
of action for abuse of process because it alleged as follows: first, the attor-
ney for the teachers' association issued judicial subpoenas duces tecum to 
eighty-seven teachers in order to compel their attendance as witnesses 
before the public employees' relations board; second, the attorney refused 
the school district's request that a majority of the teachers be excused from 
attendance at the initial hearing date; and third, the attorney refused to 
grant a request to stagger the appearances, which resulted in hiring sev-
enty-seven substitute teachers in order to replace the subpoenaed teachers. 
Id. at 280. In Board of Education v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, Local 
1889, the court stated: 
The subpoenas here were regularly issued process, defendants were 
motivated by an intent to harass and to injure, and the refusal to 
comply with a reasonable request to stagger the appearances was 
sufficient to support an inference that the process was being per-
verted to inflict economic harm on the school district. 
Id. at 283. 
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4. Spurious counterclaimsll with exorbitant ad damnum 
clauses. 12 
Black Rock's executives boast to Ruth that their tactics will continue 
to "break him" financially, and endlessly delay his lawsuit, unless he: 
l. Exonerates Black Rock of the insider trading allegations; 
2. Recants his statements that Black Rock unlawfully 
discriminated; 
3. Resigns his employment; and 
4. Foregoes filing for unemployment insurance benefits. 
Facing great financial pressure from his ever-mounting attorney's 
fees,13 and in desperate need for timely resolution of his wrongful dis-
charge suit, Ruth capitulates to Black Rock's demands. 
Under such circumstances,14 when wrongdoers like Black Rock ma-





See Johnson, supra note 9, at 940 ("Counterclaims that are dilatory or 
groundless or filed for an improper purpose also fall within the ambit [of 
the tort of abuse of process] ."). 
See Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 561 (1886) (observing that a plaintiff 
makes "an attempted fraud" upon the court when his ad damnum is "be-
yond the amount of a reasonable expectation of recovery"); see also Gemeny 
v. Starke, No. 98 C 4122,1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10752, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 
13, 1998) (criticizing the plaintiffs "in terrorem use of a patently excessive ad 
damnum prayer"); Owens Corning v. Bauman, 125 Md. App. 454, 532 n.34, 
726 A.2d 745, 783 n.34 (1999) (observing Maryland's legislative intent to 
"curb the growing amount of excessive ad damnum clauses"); Richardson v. 
Rutherford, 787 P.2d 414, 421-22 (N.M. 1990) (reversing dismissal of claim 
for abuse of process because a jury could find the ulterior motive behind an 
excessive ad damnum was to "intimidate" the defendant into a settlement). 
See generally Van Patten, supra note 9, at 898-99 (quoting Melvin Belli, The 
Law's Delays: Reforming Unnecessary Delay in Civil Litigation, 8 J. LEGIS. 17 
(1981) ). The article states: 
The ability to cause a financially weak plaintiff to incur additional 
costs in pursuit of a valid claim gives additional leverage to a 
stronger defendant. As a result, a defendant with the means to liti-
gate has little incentive to settle early. The plaintiff, however, may 
be under considerable pressure to settle on terms favorable to the 
defendant. As Melvin Belli has observed: "After a five year delay, 
the judgment becomes more a reward to a diligent litigant than an 
award to a deserving victim." 
Id. To an unscrupulous defendant inclined to abuse process for dilatory 
purposes, achieving lengthy delay is a victory in itself. But as the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland observed in Langrall, Muir, & Noppinger v. Gladding, 
'justice delayed is justice denied." 282 Md. 397, 400, 384 A.2d 737, 739 
(1978). Tort liability for abuse of process addresses this concern by provid-
ing an effective deterrent against dilatory litigation tactics. See infra Part V. 
Applying the view espoused by one commentator, Black Rock's executives 
"consummated" an abuse of process the moment they attempted to achieve 
their ulterior purposes by misusing process. See 1 FOWLER V. fIARpER & 
FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAw OF TORTS 331 (Little, Brown and Company 
1956). Under this approach, for Ruth to properly plead the tort, he need 
not allege that Black Rock actually achieved its ulterior goals. Id. "[T]he 
moment ... [a litigant] attempts to attain some collateral objective, outside 
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coercion or to exact revenge), courts should hold them accountable 
for "abuse of process." Unfortunately, in Maryland, victims such as 
Mr. Ruth have no tort remedy against flagrant litigation misconduct 
because the Court of Appeals of Maryland eviscerated the long-estab-
lished tort of abuse of process in One Thousand Fleet.15 The eviscera-
tion consisted of adding to the tort a rigid requirement that there be 
an actual seizure of property, or an arrest of the person.16 Very few 
victims of flagrant litigation misconduct can ever satisfy that narrow 
requirement. 17 For example, although Babe Ruth was badly victim-
ized by Black Rock's willful perversion of process, Ruth has no redress 
under Maryland tort law, because he suffered neither a seizure nor an 
arrest. 
This Article posits that the One Thousand Fleet court erred in adding 
the "seizure or arrest" element to Maryland's "Traditional Definition" 
of abuse of process. Part II traces the history of the tort, distinguishes 
abuse of process from the related but distinct tort of malicious use of 
process, and defines "process" for purposes of abuse of process. Part 
II also describes the tort's Damages Element, as well as the Primary 
Purpose Rule, and proposes two additional restrictions on abuse of 
process: the Compulsory Counterclaim requirement, and the Fifteen-
day "Safe Harbor" provision. Part III reviews the three phases of Mary-
land's abuse of process case law: (1) the confused Nineteenth century 
cases; (2) the rich treasure trove of modern abuse of process jurispru-
dence; and (3) the unfortunate One Thousand Fleet decision that ig-
nored Maryland's modern precedents in favor of a fundamentally 
flawed nineteenth century case. Part IV discusses the One Thousand 
Fleet court's mischaracterization of the jurisprudence of five so-called 
"sister states." Part V analyzes how important public policies support 
the "Traditional Definition" of abuse of process. Part VI explores why 
Maryland's high court may have opted to enfeeble the tort of abuse of 
process. Part VII concludes by calling on Maryland's legislature to ab-
rogate the One Thousand Fleet decision and to restore abuse of process 
to its status quo ante. 
II. ABUSE OF PROCESS: A UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED TORT 
The tort of abuse of process first gained recognition in the 
landmark nineteenth century English case, Grainger v. Hill.IS The 
the scope of the operation of the process employed, a tort has been con-
summated." Id. 
15. 346 Md. 29, 694 A.2d 952 (1997). 
16. Id. at 45, 694 A.2d at 960 ("A cause of action for civil abuse of process in 
Maryland requires that the plaintiff establish that an arrest of the person or 
a seizure of property of the plaintiff resulted from the abuse of process."). 
17. See supra text accompanying note 2. 
18. 132 Eng. Rep. 769 (1838). In this early case, a sea captain named Grainger 
used the sailing ship he owned to make commercial voyages from London 
to Normandy. Id. at 770-71. Captain Grainger borrowed a sum of money 
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Grainger court noted the following about its newly recognized tort: (1) 
in a "case primae impressionis," the court inaugurated a "new species" 
of tort, for abusing judicial process for an "ulterior purpose"; (2) 
"[t]he action is not for maliciously putting process in force, but for 
maliciously abusing the process of the Court"; (3) to prove an abuse of 
process, it is unnecessary to establish that the action in which the pro-
cess was improperly employed has been determined in favor of the 
complaining party; and (4) to prove an abuse of process, it is unneces-
sary to show that the suit in which the process was improperly em-
ployed was commenced without probable cause.19 
Today, the United States Supreme Court,20 all fifty states,21 and the 





from Hill, pledging his ship as collateral. Id. at 769. But when illness con-
fined Grainger to bed, Hill, with no justification, suddenly insisted on early 
repayment of the loan. Id. at 772-73. In fact, Hill threatened to have Grain-
ger arrested unless he immediately repaid the entire loan. Id. at 773. 
When Grainger refused, Hill caused a sheriffs officer, armed with a capias, 
to insist that unless Grainger handed over his ship's registry certificate, the 
officer would either "take him or leave a man with him." Id. Under duress 
from a threatened arrest, Grainger surrendered the ship's registry and, as a 
result, lost four voyages from London to Normandy. Id. at 770-71. The 
tribunal recognized the misuse of its process, and held Hill liable for "abus-
ing the process of the Court" to attain the "ulterior purpose" of coercing 
Grainger to surrender his ship's registry. Id. at 774. Black's Law Dictionary 
defines "capias" as the name of a writ that requires the officer to take the 
body of the defendant into custody. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 188 (5th 
ed. 1979). 
Grainger, 132 Eng. Rep. at 773-74 (emphasis added). 
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the tort of abuse of 
process. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 n.5 (1994) ("[F]avorable 
termination of prior proceedings is not an element of [abuse of process] 
. . . . The gravamen of that tort is not the wrongfulness of the prosecution, 
but some extortionate perversion of lawfully initiated process to illegitimate 
ends."); Prof! Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 
U.S. 49, 74 (1993) (Stevens, j., concurring) ("The existence of a tort of 
abuse of process shows that it has long been thought that litigation could 
be used for improper purposes even when there is probable cause for the 
litigation .... "); see al50 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 381-82 (1971) 
("alternatives exist to ... [protect] parties from frivolous litigation, such 
as ... abuse of process"). 
See Fifty State Survey infra Appendix 1. 
See Bown v. Hamilton, 601 A.2d 1074, 1079 n.14 (D.C. 1992) (citing 
Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196, 198 (D.C. 1980)). The court stated: 
Id. 
[The tort of abuse of process] lies where the legal system "has been 
used to accomplish some end which is without the regular purview 
of the process, or which compels the party against whom it is used 
to do some collateral thing which he could not legally and regu-
larly be required to do .... " 
... Abuse of process thus stands in marked contrast to the tort 
of malicious prosecution [malicious use of process], which lies only 
where the action was brought without probable cause and termi-
nated successfully in favor of the aggrieved party. 
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functional equivalent.23 The tort's "Traditional Definition"24 embod-
ies up to three elements: (1) wrongful use of process; (2) to achieve 
an ulterior purpose; (3) with damages resulting.25 Prior to One Thou-
sand Fleet's evisceration of the tort, Maryland employed the three-ele-
ment version of the "Traditional Definition" of abuse of process.26 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland27 summarized the well-established 
23. Forty-nine jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia, recognize the 
tort of abuse of process. See state survey infra Appendix I. The remaining 
two jurisdictions, Georgia and New Mexico, recognize the functional 
equivalent of abuse of process. See state survey infra Appendix I. Georgia 
recognizes the functional equivalent of abuse of process through its "abu-
sive litigation" statutory scheme. See state survey infra Appendix I. New 
Mexico recognizes the "malicious abuse of process" tort, which is the func-
tional equivalent of abuse of process. See state survey infra Appendix I. 
24. The "Traditional Definition" of abuse of process essentially comes in two 
versions: first, the two-element version, and second, the three-element ver-
sion. The two-element version of the "Traditional Definition" of abuse of 
process consists of: (1) wrongful use of process; (2) to achieve an ulterior 
purpose. See state survey infra Appendix I. The three-element version of 
the "Traditional Definition" of abuse of process consists of: (1) wrongful 
use of process; (2) to achieve an ulterior purpose; (3) with damages result-
ing. See state survey infra Appendix I. In this Article, the "Traditional Defi-
nition" of abuse of process refers, collectively, to the two-element version, 
the three-element version, and the functional equivalents thereof. The 
"Traditional Definition" of abuse of process, however, excludes the One 
Thousand Fleet court's eviscerated version of the tort. In this Article, Mary-
land's "Traditional Definition" of abuse of process refers to the three-ele-
ment version of the "Traditional Definition" of abuse of process, as 
recognized by Maryland's pre-One Thousand Fleet jurisprudence. See infra 
note 26 and accompanying text. 
25. See, e.g., Berman v. Karvounis, 308 Md. 259, 262, 518 A.2d 726, 727 (1987). 
26. [d. ("To sustain an action of abuse of process the plaintiff must show that: 1. 
the defendant wilfully used process for an illegal purpose; 2. to satisfy the 
defendant's ulterior motive; and 3. the plaintiff was damaged by the defen-
dant's perverted use of process."). 
27. One Thousand Fleet, 346 Md. at 38-39, 694 A.2d at 956-57. Ironically, prior to 
eviscerating the tort of abuse of process, the One Thousand Fleet court pro-
vided a fine exegesis of the tort's essential nature and elements, as defined 
by Maryland's modern jurisprudence. [d. This discussion of Maryland's 
"Traditional Definition" of abuse of process appeared in a distinct section 
rather early on in the One Thousand Fleet opinion. [d. at 38, 694 A.2d at 956. 
It was only at the very end of the opinion that the One Thousand Fleet court 
added the seizure or arrest element to the abuse of process tort. [d. at 45, 
694 A.2d at 960. The One Thousand Fleet opinion's organizational style may 
help explain why the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland misinterpreted 
One Thousand Fleet as applying Maryland's "Traditional Definition" of abuse 
of process. Compare McCauley v. Suls, 123 Md. App. 179, 191, 716 A.2d 
1129, 1135 (1998) (citing One Thousand Fleet, 346 Md. at 38, 694 A.2d at 
956) (explaining that an abuse of process claimant must prove ''first, that 
the defendants wilfully used process after it has issued in a manner not 
contemplated by law; second, that the defendants acted to satisfy an ulterior 
motive; and third, that damages resulted from the defendants' perverted 
use of process") (emphasis added), with One Thousand Fleet, 346 Md. at 45, 
694 A.2d at 960 (limiting abuse of process "cognizable damages" to "an 
arrest of the person or a seizure of property of the plaintiff'). 
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tort's essential nature and elements, as developed over the years by 
Maryland's modern abuse of process jurisprudence, as follows: 
1. To sustain a cause of action for abuse of process, the 
plaintiff must prove, ''first, that the defendant wilfully 
used process after it has issued in a manner not contem-
plated by law; second, that the defendant acted to satisfy 
an ulterior motive; and third, that damages resulted from 
the defendant's perverted use of process."28 
2. Abuse of process is a distinct tort, "essentially different 
and independent" from malicious use of process.29 
28. One Thousand Fleet, 346 Md. at 38, 694 A.2d at 956 (emphasis added) (cita-
tions omitted). 
29. Id. at 39, 694 A.2d at 956. The One Thousand Fleet court accurately set forth 
the five elements of malicious use of process as follows: 
First, a prior civil proceeding must have been instituted by the de-
fendant. Second, the proceeding must have been instituted without 
probable cause. Probable cause for purposes of malicious use of 
process means "a reasonable ground for belief in the existence of 
such state of facts as would warrant institution of the suit or pro-
ceeding complained of." Third, the prior civil proceeding must 
have been instituted by the defendant with malice. Malice in the 
context of malicious use of process means that the party instituting 
proceedings was actuated by an improper motive. As a matter of 
proof, malice may be inferred from a lack of probable cause. 
Fourth, the proceedings must have been terminated in favor of the 
plaintiff. Finally, the plaintiff must establish that damages were in-
flicted upon the plaintiff by arrest or imprisonment, by seizure of 
property, or other special injury which would not necessarily result 
in all suits prosecuted to recover for a like cause of action. 
Id. at 37, 694 A.2d at 956 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In af-
firming dismissal of Fleet's malicious use of process claim, the One Thou-
sand Fleet court reasoned: 
[Fleet's alleged] damages are inadequate to maintain a cause of 
action for malicious use of process. Fleet alleges neither an arrest 
nor seizure of its property. Nor does Fleet allege a "special injury" 
for purposes of malicious use of process. To qualify as a "special 
injury," the damages must be different than those that ordinarily 
result from all suits for like causes of action. Fleet's alleged dam-
ages do not qualify as a special injury because any real estate devel-
oper facing a legal challenge to the zoning of its property would 
have suffered the same damages regardless of whether the zoning 
challenge was rightfully or wrongfully instituted. . .. [The Guer-
riero group's] zoning challenges would likely have impeded financ-
ing, caused delays, and decreased rental revenue under any 
circumstances. The damages Fleet suffered as a result of [the Zon-
ing Lawsuit] are those that would ordinarily result from proceed-
ings for similar causes of action. 
Id. at 44-45, 694 A.2d at 959. For an excellent discussion of the ancient 
origins of the malicious use of process tort, see William C. Campbell, Note, 
Groundless Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A Historical Analysis, 
88 YALE LJ. 1218, 1221 (1979) ("Anglo-Saxon courts employed a simple 
system for guarding against false suits: the complainant unfortunate to lose 
his cause also lost his tongue, or, if that option proved distasteful, was com-
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3. Abuse of process provides a remedy for those cases "in 
which legal procedure has been set in motion in proper 
form, with probable cause, and even with ultimate suc-
cess, but nevertheless has been pervert~d ,to accom~lish 
an ulterior purpose for which it was not designed." 0 
4. Abuse of process concerns "misuse of the tools the law 
affords litigants once they are in a lawsuit."31 
Unlike Maryland, a large majority of jurisdictions impose no dam-
ages requirement for abuse of process; instead, they prescribe only 
two elements: (l) wrongful use of process; (2) to achieve an ulterior 
purpose.32 Only seventeen states require a damages element.33 Re-
gardless of whether a particular jurisdiction favors the two-element 
version or the three-element version of the "Traditional Definition" 
of abuse of process, the salient point remains that recent case law in 
all fifty-one jurisdictions, including Maryland, embraces the "Tradi-
tional Definition."34 Maryland's membership in this unanimous 
group, however, carries an important caveat: Although an intermedi-
ate appellate court approved the "Traditional Definition" in McCauley 
v. Suls,35 it did so only by ignoring sub silentio the state supreme court's 
recent evisceration of the abuse of process tort in One Thousand Fleet. 36 
A. Distinguishing Abuse of Process from Malicious Use of Process 
The two torts, abuse of process and malicious use of process, are 
similar because they are both intentional torts, and they both deal 









pelled to pay his opponent compensation, called wer, which was fixed ac-
cording to the complainant's status."). 
One Thousand Fleet, 346 Md. at 38, 694 A.2d at 956 (quoting W. KEETON, 
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 121, at 897 (5th ed. 1984)). 
Id. at 39, 694 A.2d at 957. 
See state survey infra Appendix I. 
See state survey infra Appendix I. 
See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. 
123 Md. App. 179, 716A.2d 1129 (1998). 
346 Md. 29,43-44, 694 A.2d 952,959 (1996). 
Cuillo v. Shupnick, 815 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (observing that abuse 
of process is an intentional tort); see also McAuliffe, supra note 7, at 19. The 
McAuliffe article states: 
The fact that abuse of process and [malicious use of process] are 
both intentional torts should not prove to be a factor in curtailing 
their use as weapons against abusive litigation practices. The gim-
micks that satisfy the description of "Rambo" litigation tactics are 
rarely undertaken inadvertently or negligently. To the contrary, 
they are undertaken purposefully to wear down the opposition so 
as to achieve a resolution of a controversy on the basis of considera-
tions that bear little or no relationship to its merits. 
Id.; see also 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 14, at 4:85 - 4:86 (stating that both 
actions [abuse of process and malicious use of process] deal with the per-
version of the legal system). See generally Johnson, supra note 9, at 939. The 
Johnson article observes: 
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ence between the two is one of timing: whereas malicious use of pro-
cess always concerns whether a lawsuit was initiated without cause,38 
abuse of process only deals with perversions of the tools of litigation 
occurring after a lawsuit has commenced.39 Therefore, the tort action 
for abuse of process does not pertain to the filing of a groundless 
suit.40 
Another key distinction that emerges from a comparison of the two 
torts' elements41 is that malicious use of process claims generally are 
[d. 
The terms malicious [use of process] and abuse of process 
often are used together, but the two causes of action are not inter-
changeable. One difference is that, unlike a malicious [use of pro-
cess] action, an abuse of process claim may be filed before the 
termination of the original action. The major distinction, however, 
concerns the different situations in which an abuse of process ac-
tion applies .... 
A party has abused legal process if he used the court's 
processes in a manner not contemplated by law. 
38. QSP, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 773 A2d 906,919 (Conn. 2001) (quot-
ing Schaefer v. O.K. Tool Co., 148 A 330 (Conn. 1930)) (noting that the 
distinction between malicious use of process and "abuse of process as tort 
actions is that in the former the wrongful act is the commencement of an 
action without legal justification, and in the latter it is in the subsequent 
proceedings"); see also supra note 29 (discussing the elements of malicious 
use of process) and note 26 (discussing the elemen ts of abuse of process) . 
39. See Batten v. Abrams, 626 P.2d 984, 990-91 (Wash. App. 1981). The Batten 
court stated that: 
[T]here must be an act after filing suit using legal process empow-
ered by that suit to accomplish an end not within the purview of 
the suit . 
. . . [The] initiation of vexatious civil proceedings known to be 
groundless is not abuse of process .... [T] he bringing of a baseless 
lawsuit will not establish the act that is the essential element of 
abuse of process. 
[d.; see also Philip L. Gordon, Defeating Abusive Claims and Counterclaims for 
Abuse of Process, COLO. LAw., Mar. 2001, at 48. The author states that: 
[d. 
The purpose of the court system is to distinguish between meritori-
ous and meritless claims. Therefore, a litigant who files claims sub-
sequently held to be meritless has used the judicial process for its 
intended purpose, even if the complaint was filed with an ulterior 
motive. . . . In short, an allegation that a complaint was filed with 
an ulterior purpose does not in and of itself plead a claim for abuse 
of process. 
40. See, e.g., Amway Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., No. 1:98-CV-726, 2001 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 2877, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 2001); Wells v. Orthwein, 670 
S.W.2d 529 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Brault v. Smith, 679 P.2d 236 (Mont. 
1984); Key Bank of Northern New York v. Lake Placid Co., 103 AD.2d 19, 
479 N.Y.S.2d 862 (App. Div. 1984); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 
App. 1978); see also supra note 39. 
41. See supra note 26 (discussing the elements of abuse of process) and supra 
note 29 (discussing the elements of malicious use of process). 
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more difficult to establish than abuse of process claims.42 This dichot-
omy serves the important public policy of promoting "free access to 
the courts" in two ways: First, if courts made it too easy to prove mali-
cious use of process claims, the resulting "chilling effect" could dis-
suade plaintiffs from filing suit for fear that if they lose they could face 
tort liability for malicious use of process. Second, if courts made it too 
difficult to prove abuse of process claims, litigants could no longer 
challenge an opponent's abusive tactics, and their right to "free access 
to the courts" could become a hollow pretense.43 
B. ''Process, "for purposes of abuse of process, encompasses the full panoply of 
procedures incident to litigation, including: motions, subpoenas, and 
discovery.44 
"Process," as used in the tort of abuse of process, is "interpreted 
broadly to encompass the entire range of procedures incident to liti-
gation."45 As the California Supreme Court observed, "[t]he broad 
reach of the 'abuse of process' tort can be explained historically, since 
the tort evolved as a 'catch-all' category to cover improper uses of the 
42. Nathan M. Crystal, Limitations on Zealous Representation in an Adversarial Sys-
tem, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 671,687 (1997). The article states: 
Comparison of the elements of the two torts indicates that it should 
be easier to establish a claim for abuse of process than a claim for 
malicious [use of process]. Both torts call for an improper pur-
pose. Malicious [use of process], however, requires termination of 
the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff, while abuse of process does 
not. In addition, malicious [use of process] requires that the pro-
ceeding be brought without probable cause. Abuse of process does 
not have this requirement; the tort occurs when process is used for 
a purpose other than that for which it was intended. 
Id.; see also Wesko v. G.E.M., Inc., 272 Md. 192, 195, 321 A.2d 529, 531 
(1974) ("[In an action for abuse of process] recovery may generally be had 
without the necessity of showing lack of probable cause or the termination 
of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff."); Devaney v. Thriftway Mktg. 
Corp., 953 P.2d 277, 282 (N.M. 1997) ("Originally, the tort of abuse of 
process was created in order to alleviate the harsh procedural requirements 
of malicious [use of process]."); John W. Wade, On Frivolous Litigation: A 
Study of Tort Liability and Procedural Sanctions, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 433, 451 
(1986) ("Courts have looked with more favor on abuse of process than on 
malicious civil prosecution."). 
43. See infra Part V.A-B. 
44. Wade, supra note 42, at 450 n.60. 
45. Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n of Oakland, Inc., 496 P.2d 817, 824 
(Cal. 1972); see also Nienstedt v. Wetzel, 651 P.2d 876, 880 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1982) (citing Barquis, 496 P.2d at 824). The Arizona court stated that 
"through develo~ing case law the word 'process' as used in the tort of 
'abuse of process is not restricted to the narrow sense of that term. Rather, 
it has been interpreted broadly, and encompasses the entire range of pro-
cedures incident to the litigation process." Id. 
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judicial machinery that did not fit within the earlier established, but 
narrowly circumscribed, action of malicious [use of process] . "46 
The abuse of process tort's protean nature is illustrated by numer-
ous court decisions finding in favor of abuse of process plaintiffs.47 
The following list exemplifies the variety of civil judicial procedures 






1. Motions (e.g., motions for protective orders, change of 
judge, sanctions, and continuances);48 
2. Subpoenas;49 
3. Summonses;50 
Barquis, 496 P.2d at 824. The Barquis court referred to malicious use of 
process as "malicious prosecution." Id. The two terms are essentially synon-
ymous. De Leo v. Anthony A. Nunes, Inc., No. 86-516-Appeal, 1988 R.1. 
LEXIS 122, at *9 (R.I. Aug. 24, 1988) (discussing "[t]he tort of malicious 
prosecution, or malicious use of process as it is sometimes called"). In this 
Article, for the sake of clarity, most references to "malicious prosecution" 
have been changed to "malicious use of process." On occasion, Maryland 
courts have drawn a terminological distinction between "malicious prosecu-
tion" (maliciously causing criminal process to issue for its ostensible pur-
pose, but without probable cause), and "malicious use of process" 
(maliciously causing civil process to issue for its ostensible purpose, but 
without probable cause); see infra note 125. 
This Article focuses on abuse of process in the civil context. For the 
essential Maryland case concerning abuse of criminal process, see Krashes v. 
White, 275 Md. 549, 555, 341 A.2d 798, 801-02 (1975). In Krashes, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland held that, for purposes of establishing the elements 
of abuse of process in a criminal case, "the issuance by a court of some sort 
of criminal process against a party is necessary before that party can prop-
erly bring an action ... [but] ... there is no requirement that the party be 
arrested or that an arrest warrant against him be issued." Id. In sum, the 
Krashes court held that "arrest is not an essential element of the tort of 
abuse of criminal process." Id. at 556, 341 A.2d at 802. 
Twenty-three court decisions from twelve jurisdictions have found the ele-
ments of abuse of process to be satisfied. See Case Law Survey infra Appen-
dix II. 
See, e.g., Nienstedt, 651 P.2d at 880-81 ("[W]e therefore consider as 
'processes' of the court for abuse of process purposes, the noticing of depo-
sitions, the entry of defaults, and the utilization of various motions such as 
motions to compel production, for r,rotective orders, for change of judge, 
for sanctions and for continuances.' ). 
See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, Local 1889, 
343 N.E.2d 278, 283 (N.Y. 1975). The court explained: 
The subpoenas here were regularly issued process, defendants were 
motivated by an intent to harass and to injure, and the refusal to 
comply with a reasonable request to stagger the appearances was 
sufficient to support an inference that the process was being per-
verted to inflict economic harm on the school district. 
Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 45.01 (2001) ("Subpoenas shall be issued only in 
connection with a duly noted deposition .... Violation of this provision 
constitutes an abuse of process, and shall subject the attorney or party to 
appropriate sanctions or damages."). 
See, e.g., Lauren Corp. v. Century Geophysical Corp., 953 P.2d 200 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1998) (upholding an abuse of process judgment against a plaintiff 
that had summonsed its opponent to defend a lawsuit in a distant forum 
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4. Discoverf! (e.g., interrogatories,52 depositions,53 and re-
quests for admissions54); 
5. Lis pendens;55 
6. Default orders;56 and 
7. Ad damnum clauses.57 
C. Limitations on the Tort of Abuse of Process 
1. The Damages Element 
Only 17 jurisdictions (including Maryland) limit the tort of abuse of 
process by requiring a damages element.58 For example, under Mary-
land's pre-One Thousand Fleet jurisprudence, the abuse of process dam-
ages element encompassed damages other than an arrest or seizure of 
property. 59 Specifically, an abuser of process was "liable for all the 
consequences that reasonably result [ ed]" from the abuse of process.60 
In One Thousand Fleet, the court made an abrupt about-face by limiting 
"cognizable damages" to those resulting from a seizure or arrest.61 
But in other jurisdictions, due to the tort's flexible nature, cognizable 
damages for abuse of process continue to run the gamut according to 
despite knowledge that the distant forum lacked personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant); Wanzer v. Bright,' 52 Ill. 35, 36 (1869) (affirming abuse of 
process judgment against a creditor that misused a summons by fraudu-
lently inducing a debtor to come within the jurisdiction of the court so as to 
render him amenable to its process). 
51. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
52. See, e.g., Younger v. Solomon, 113 Cal. Rptr. 113, 118 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) 
(interpreting the term "process," as used in the tort of abuse of process, as 
including written interrogatories). 
53. See, e.g., Hopper v. Drysdale, 524 F. Supp. 1039, 1042 (D. Mont. 1981) 
("[A]buse of the authority to notice and take depositions may serve as the 
basis for the tort of abuse of process."). 
54. See, e.g., Twyford v. Twyford, 63 Cal. Rptr. 145, 149 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) 
(" [A] request for admissions is ... capable of being abused in the same way 
as interrogatories and depositions, and therefore can form the basis for an 
abuse of process action."). 
55. See, e.g., Station Assocs., Inc. v. Long Island RR, 188 N.Y.S.2d 435, 439-40 
(App. Div. 1959) (upholding abuse of process claim based on improper use 
of a lis pendens for ulterior purposes); see state survey infra Appendix II. 
56. See supra note 48. 
57. See supra note 12. 
58. See state survey infra Appendix I. 
59. See, e.g., Wesko v. G.E.M., Inc., 272 Md. 192,321 A.2d 529 (1974) (recogniz-
ing that proof of damage other than an arrest or a seizure of property is 
sufficient to establish the tort of abuse of process). 
60. Palmer Ford, Inc. v. Wood, 65 Md. App. 390, 397-98, 500 A.2d 1055, 1059 
(1985) (observing that when criminal or civil process has been "perverted 
by misapplication to an end for which that process was never intended, the 
abuser is liable for all the consequences that reasonably result from the 
process"). 
61. One Thousand Fleet, 346 Md. at 45, 694 A.2d at 960; see also supra note 2 and 
accompanying text. 
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the special circumstances and conditions present in each case.62 For 
example, an abuse of process victim may be awarded the following 
compensatory damages: 
1. The cost of hiring substitutes for employees improperly 
subpoenaed;63 
2. Excessive litigation expenses;64 
3. Reputational or emotional harm;65 
4. Lost profits;66 and 
5. All harm reasonably flowing from the abuse of process.67 
In order to achieve the abuse of process tort's goal of restitution, 
our civil justice system must adequately compensate abuse of process 
victims. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire insightfully echoed 
this sentiment: 
[A]nyone who has been a litigant knows that the fact of liti-
gation has a profound effect upon the quality of one's 
life. . . . Litigation is a disturbing influence to one degree or 
another. The litigant may have the benefit of skilled and 
conscientious counsel as well as a strong and well-founded 
case on the facts, but until such time as the favorable verdict 
is in hand beyond the reach of appeal, there is a day-to-day 
uncertainty of the outcome. One wonders about the availa-
bility of witnesses at the appropriate times and whether their 
information will be adequately imparted. One may have 
gnawing uncertainty about the myriad things that can go 
wrong in a lawsuit.68 
Therefore, when the price of litigation, in terms of time, money, and 
uncertainty is substantially exacerbated by an opponent's abuse of 
process, "the litigant is not made whole if the only remedy is reim-









See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text. 
Bd. of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n., Local 1889, 43 
N.E.2d 278, 280 (N.Y. 1975) (school district suffered "economic harm" by 
being forced to hire seventy-seven substitute teachers to replace improperly 
subpoenaed teachers). 
Nienstedt, 651 P.2d at 882 (abuse of process defendant's "primary purpose" 
was to subject his opponent to "excessive litigation expenses"). 
Devaney v. Thriftway Mktg. Corp., 953 P.2d 277, 290 (N.M. 1997) (" [A mali-
cious abuse of process plaintifll has the burden of demonstrating actual 
damages for all forms of harm, including reputational or emotional 
harm."). 
Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, No. 92 C 7768, 
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 917, at *2 (N.D. IlI.Jan. IS, 1999) (applying Arizona 
law) (holding that the question of calculating lost profit damages for the 
alleged abuse of process was a jury question). 
Palmer Ford, Inc. v. Wood, 65 Md. App. 390,397-98,500 A.2d 1055, 1059 
(1985). 
Aranson v. Schroeder, 671 A.2d 1023, 1028 (N.H. 1995). 
Id. 
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court limited "cognizable damages" to those resulting from a seizure 
or arrest,70 thereby thwarting the goal of restitution by denying com-
pensation to abuse of process victims for all harm prox:imately result-
ing from the abuse.71 
2. The "Primary Purpose" Rule 
The Restatement (Second) oj Torts recognizes an important limitation 
on the tort of abuse of process by defining it as the use of process 
"primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed."72 The 
Restatement's comment explains the significance of the Primary Pur-
pose Rule: 
"Primarily." The significance of this word is that there is no 
action for abuse of process when the process is used for the 
purpose for which it is intended, but there is an incidental 
motive of spite or an ulterior purpose of benefit to the 
defendan t. 71 
In Nienstedt v. Wetzel,74 the Arizona court cogently explained how 
the Primary Purpose Rule applies to the tort of abuse of process: 
We recognize that the utilization of virtually any available liti-
gation procedure by an attorney will generally be accompa-
nied by an awareness on that attorney's part that his action 
will necessarily subject the opposing party to additional legal 
expenses. The range of feeling in the initiating attorney 
evoked by that awareness might well vary from instances of 
actual indifference to instances of intense satisfaction. By 
our holding in this case we do not intend to suggest that 
liability for abuse of process should result from either of the 
said instances alone. Liability should result only when the sense oj 
awareness progresses to a sense oj purpose, and, in addition, the 
utilization oj the procedure Jor the purposes Jor which it was designed 
becomes so lacking in justification as to lose its legitimate Junction as 
a reasonably justifiable litigation procedure. . .. There was evi-
dence presented here of many instances from which a trier 
of fact could have concluded that the ulterior or collateral 
purpose of appellant Manfred Wetzel to subject the Nien-
70. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
71. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
72. Section 682 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: "One who uses a 
legal process, whether criminal or civil, against another primarily to accom-
plish a purpose for which it is not designed, is subject to liability to the 
other for harm caused by the abuse of process." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 682 (1977). 
73. [d. cmt. b. But cf RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw GoVERNING LAWYERS (THIRD) 
§ l10 cmt. c, 172 (2000) ("[L]itigation measures may not be taken for an 
improper purpose, even in instances in which they are otherwise minimally 
supportable.") . 
74. 651 P.2d 876 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). 
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stedts to excessive litigation expenses was in fact his primary 
purpose, and that his use of various legal processes was not 
justified or used for legitimate or reasonably justifiable pur-
poses of advancing appellants' interests in ongoing 
litigation. 75 
3. The Compulsory Counterclaim Requirement 
Another limitation on the tort of abuse of process should be the 
requirement to assert an abuse of process claim within the very same 
litigation in which the alleged abuse occurred.76 Such a requirement 
makes good sense both to promote judicial economy, and to spare 
litigants the inconvenience and expense of multiple litigations.77 Be-
cause abuse of process may occur during any stage of litigation, proce-
dural rules 78 should be applied flexibly to permit "late" filed pleadings 
asserting abuse of process.79 
4. The Fifteen-day "Safe Harbor" Provision 
Another limitation on the tort of abuse of process should be the 
creation of a "Safe Harbor" affording alleged abusers of process fif-
teen days prior notice of the intent to bring an abuse of process claim, 
a period during which they may avoid liability by abandoning the abu-







Id. at 882 (emphasis added). 
See generally Joseph B. Maher, Survival of the Common Law Abuse of Process Tort 
in the Face of a Noerr-Pennington Defense, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 627, 628 n.7 
(1998). The author recognized that "[one] advantage of the abuse of pro-
cess tort is that it may be alleged as a counterclaim within the same trial. 
[In contrast, the malicious use of process] requirement, that a suit be favor-
ably terminated, would otherwise require a defendant to initiate her own 
suit at a later time. This not only inconveniences the defendant, but also 
wastes judicial resources. » Id. 
Id. 
See, e.g., MD. RULE 2-331 (d) (Maryland's thirty-day deadline for asserting 
counterclaims); MD. RULE 2-341 (Maryland's flfteen-days-before-trial dead-
line for amending complaints). 
See Anne Proffitt, Yost v. Torok and Abusive Litigation: A New Tort to Solve an 
Old Problem, 21 GA. L. REv. 429, 452 (1986). Proffitt recognizes that "abuse 
of the litigation process, however, does not always occur during the plead-
ing stage, but sometimes during discovery and even at trial. ... [T] rial 
judges must be willing to permit the pleader to supplement the original 
pleading with a counterclaim that matured or was acquired after pleading." 
Id. 
See Carroll County Water Auth. v. Bunch, 523 S.E.2d 412, 413-14 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1999) (citing Talbert v. Allstate Ins. Co., 408 S.E.2d 125 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1991» (emphasizing Georgia's abusive litigation statute's notice require-
ment's "overriding purpose to give a prospective defendant the chance to 
change position and avoid liability"). Georgia's Annotated Code states: 
As a condition precedent to any claim for abusive litigation, the 
person injured by such act shall give written notice by registered or 
certifled mail or statutory overnight delivery or some other means 
18 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 32 
1182 both employ this common-sense measure that encourages liti-
gants to "work it out" among themselves, thereby promoting the im-
portant public policy favoring judicial economy.83 
III. MARYLAND'S ANCIENT AND MODERN ABUSE OF PROCESS 
JURISPRUDENCE 
In One Thousand Fleet,84 for no overt reason, and contrary to impor-
tant public policy considerations,85 the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
added "arrest or seizure" as a new element to abuse of process,86 
thereby enfeebling a perfectly valid and useful tort. The state's high-
est court mistakenly justified its decision by relying on a confused, 
century-old Maryland case,87 and by mischaracterizing the jurispru-
evidencing receipt by the addressee to any person against whom 
such injured person intends to assert a claim for abusive litigation 
and shall thereby give the person against whom an abusive litiga-
tion claim is contemplated an opportunity to voluntarily withdraw, 
abandon, discontinue, or dismiss the civil proceeding, claim, de-
fense, motion, appeal, civil process, or other position. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-7-84(a) (2000); Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced 
Approach to "Frivolous" Litigation: A Critical Review of Federal Rule 11 and State 
Sanctions Provisions, 21 PEPP. L. REv. 1067, 1091-92 (1994). The article 
states that: 
Id. 
Under the 1993 amendments [to Federal Rule 11], a litigant can-
not file or present a sanctions motion to the district court until 
twenty-one days after serving the motion on the alleged offender. 
Within the twenty-one day "safe harbor," the offender can withdraw 
or correct the challenged document and thus avoid sanctions. The 
function of the "safe harbor" provision is to lessen the chilling ef-
fect of Rule 11 by insulating litigants from sanctions for correctable 
mistakes. 
8l. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-7-81 (2000) ("Any person who takes an active part 
in the initiation, continuation, or procurement of civil proceedings against 
another shall be liable for abusive litigation if such person acts: (1) with 
malice; and (2) without substantial justification."); see also supra note 80. 
82. Rule 11 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by 
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written 
motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certi-
fying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and 
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circum-
stances,-
(l) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such 
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in 
the cost of litigation. 
FED. R. Crv. P. l1(b); see also supra note 80. 
83. See supra notes 81-82. 
84. 346 Md. 29, 694 A.2d 952 (1997); see also supra note 1 and accompanying 
text. 
85. See infra Part V. 
86. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
87. Bartlett v. Christhilf, 69 Md. 219, 14 A. 518 (1888); see infra notes 90-108 
and accompanying text. 
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dence of several "sister states" as "in accord" with its decision.88 In-
stead of unwisely burdening the tort with a new element, the One 
Thousand Fleet court should have simply applied Maryland's "Tradi-
tional Definition" of abuse of process.89 To place the One Thousand 
Fleet court's mistake in proper perspective, this Article next will ana-
lyze Maryland's ancient and modern abuse of process jurisprudence. 
A. Maryland's "Confused" Nineteenth Century Abuse of Process 
Jurisprudence 
1. Bartlett v. Christhilf 
In the 1888 case of Bartlett v. Christhilf,90 the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland committed the common mistake9 } of confusing the ele-
ments of abuse of process with those applicable to malicious use of 
88. See infra Part IV. 
89. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
90. 69 Md. 219, 14 A. 518 (1888). Bartlett concerned a dispute between two 
court-appointed co-receivers, Kemp Bartlett Jr. and Henry Christhilf. In 
the litigation in which Bartlett and Christhilfwere receivers (the "Underly-
ing Lawsuit"), Christhilf filed a petition seeking Bartlett's removal for his 
alleged embezzlement and other improprieties. [d. at 222, 14 A. at 518. 
Before any hearing on the petition, the Underlying Lawsuit was settled and 
dismissed. [d. Subsequently, Bartlett sued Christhilf for "malicious abuse 
of process" based on the filing of the removal petition. [d. Ostensibly, the 
Bartlett opinion concerned "malicious abuse of process," but its holding 
turned on the principle, unique to the law of malicious use of process, that 
one who institutes an unfounded suit faces no liability in the absence of a 
seizure or arrest. [d. at 231, 14 A. at 522. Because the Bartlett opinion con-
fused the two torts, it offered no insight into the abuse of process tort. 
91. Courts and commentators have recognized that the torts of abuse of pro-
cess and malicious use of process are often confused with one another. See 
Access Fin. Lending Corp. v. Keystone State Mortgage Corp., No. 96-191, 
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14073, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1996) ("In determin-
ing whether the defendant has stated a claim for abuse of process, a review 
of Pennsylvania jurisprudence addressing not only that tort, but also the 
tort of malicious use of process, is helpful. The two torts are often con-
fused."); Keller v. Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, 896 F. Supp. 1563, 1570 n.15 
(D. Utah 1995) ("The court's research reveals that it is common to confuse 
abuse of process with malicious [use of process] both substantively and also 
through a failure to recognize distinctions in terminology."); Warwick Dev. 
Co. v. GV Corp., 469 So. 2d 1270, 1274 (Ala. 1985) ("Abuse of process is 
often confused with the tort of malicious [use of process]."); Devaney v. 
Thriftway Mktg. Corp., 953 P.2d 277, 282 (N.M. 1997) ("Many courts and 
litigants have experienced a great deal of difficulty in distinguishing a claim 
of abuse of process from one of malicious [use of processJ because these 
two torts are closely related."); Bd. of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom 
Teachers Ass'n, Local 1889,343 N.E.2d 278, 280-81 (N.Y. 1975) ("Abuse of 
process, i.e., causing process to issue lawfully but to accomplish some unjus-
tified purpose, is frequently confused with malicious [use of process], i.e., 
maliciously causing process to issue without justification."); See also Wade, 
supra note 42, at 451 ("Although the two torts are quite different and need 
to be carefully distinguished, their similarity has not infrequently produced 
confusion in the understanding of some courts, with erroneous decisions 
resulting.") . 
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process.92 Although the Bartlett opinion ostensibly considered the 
plaintiffs claim as one for "malicious abuse of process,"93 in reality, 
the court's analysis focused on the elements required to establish tort 
liability for initiating an unfounded lawsuit,94 a concept that is 
uniquely associated with malicious use of process.95 For important 
public policy reasons, such as the prevention of unending litigation 
and promotion of free access to the courts,96 some courts require a 
high damage threshold (e.g., seizure or arrest) to impose malicious 
use of process liability for initiating an unfounded lawsuit.97 On the 
other hand, the mere initiation of an unfounded suit, without more, 
cannot amount to an abuse of process.98 Abuse of process evolved as 
a more flexible tort to redress perversion of the tools of litigation oc-
curring after the initiation of a well-founded suit.99 With these princi-
ples in mind, it is clear that the Bartlett court confused the two torts. lOO 
To outward appearances, the Bartlett opinion concerned "malicious 
abuse of process,"lOl but its holding emphasized the principle, unique 
to the law of malicious use of process, that one who institutes an un-
founded suit faces no liability in the absence of a seizure or arrest. 102 
Specifically, in language quoted in One Thousand Fleet,103 the Bartlett 
court stated that "[i]t will hardly be seriously contended that where 
there has been no wrongful deprivation of liberty or no illegal seizure 
of property, that each unfounded suit ... will sustain an action against 














The Bartlett court referred to malicious use of process as "malicious prose-
cution of a civil suit without probable cause." 69 Md. at 228, 14 A. at 522; 
see supra note 29 (discussing the elements of malicious use of process); see 
supra also note 26 (discussing the elements of abuse of process) 
69 Md. at 228, 14 A. at 520 (1888). 
[d. at 230, 14 A. at 521-22. 
Claims alleging initiation of an unfounded suit are properly analyzed under 
the malicious use of process nlbric. See supra notes 38-42 and accompany-
ing text. 
See supra text accompanying note 43 (discussing the threat to "free access to 
the courts" in the context of malicious use of process); see also infra Part V. 
(discussing the threat of "endless litigation" in the context of malicious use 
of process). 
See supra note 29. 
See generally, e.g., Berman v. Karvounis, 308 Md. 259, 518 A.2d 726 (1987) 
(illustrating the often-stated rule that the mere initiation of suit, no matter 
how unfounded, cannot amount to an abuse of process); see supra notes 38-
42 and accompanying text; see also infra note 121. 
Gordon v. Cmty. First State Bank, 587 N.W.2d 343, 351 (Neb. 1998) ("His-
torically, the tort of abuse of process evolved as a 'catch-all' category to 
cover improper uses of the judicial machinery that did not fit within the 
earlier established, but narrowly circumscribed, action of [malicious use of 
process] ."); see also supra notes 38-40, 98 and accompanying text. 
See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text. 
69 Md. at 228, 14 A. at 520. 
[d. at 230-31, 14 A. at 521-22. 
346 Md. at 46, 694 A.2d at 960. 
69 Md. at 231, 14 A. at 522. 
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In sum, Bartlett focused on elements of liability for the initiation of 
unfounded suits,105 a concept completely foreign to an abuse of pro-
cess analysis. 106 Consequently, the Bartlett opinion offered little in-
sight into the tort of abuse of process. 107 Thus, Bartlett formed a poor 
foundation for the One Thousand Fleet court's holding, which more 
than a century later would add the rigid, eviscerating "seizure or ar-
rest" element to the abuse of process tort. lOS 
2. Gore v. Candon 
The court of appeals' early confusion regarding abuse of process 
persisted in the 1898 case, Gore v. Condon. 109 Nine decades later, in 
1987, Maryland's highest court candidly acknowledged that its nine-
teenth century brethren had indeed "confused" the elements of abuse 
of process and malicious use of process. 110 Specifically, the Gore court 
erred by stating that "[i]n an action for malicious [use of process] or 
abuse of process the plaintiff must allege and prove that the suit was 
instituted maliciously, and without probable cause."lll In reality, an 
105. Id. at 230, 14 A. at 522. 
106. The mere institution of a lawsuit, no matter how unfounded, cannot 
amount to an abuse of process. See supra notes 38-42, 98 and accompanying 
text. 





See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
87 Md. 368, 39 A. 1042 (1898). Gore concerned a dispute between a prop-
erty owner, Martha Gore, and Levi Condon. Id. at 372, 29 A. at 1042. Al-
though Condon knew that Ms. Gore owned a certain parcel, he 
fraudulently obtained a mortgage on the parcel from Daniel Fraizer. Id. at 
372, 39 A. at 1042-43. Under color of the fraudulent mortgage, Condon 
obtained an ex parte decree from the Baltimore City Circuit Court ordering 
the sale of Gore's property. Id. at 372-73, 39 A. at 1043. Gore filed a com-
plaint in the circuit court, seeking to halt the sale. !d. at 373. The trial court 
dismissed the complaint, and Gore appealed to the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland. 87 Md. at 373, 39 A. at 1043. While the appeal was pending, 
Condon sold Gore's property. Id. The appeals court, however, reversed the 
circuit court, declaring the mortgage to be fraudulent, and Condon's sale 
of the property was set aside. Id. at 374, 39 A. at 1043. Subsequently, Gore 
sued Condon to recover for her lost rents and property value depreciation 
caused by Condon's fraudulent scheme. Id. at 3'74-75,39 A. at 1043-44. The 
circuit court dismissed Gore's claim, but the court of appeals again re-
versed the trial court, reasoning as follows: 
It would certainly seem just that if a man knows that certain prop-
erty is not his, but another's, and that he acquired an apparent title 
to the same by fraud, and that the title is void, then his intermed-
dling with such property to the damage of the real owner is an 
unlawful act, for which a remedy should be afforded. 
Id. at 376, 39 A. at 1044. 
Berman v. Karvounis, 308 Md. 259, 263, 518 A.2d 726, 728 (1987) (describ-
ing Gore v. Condon as "apparently confusing the elements of abuse of pro-
cess and malicious [use of process]"). 
87 Md. at 375, 39 A. at 1044. 
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action for abuse of process does not require proof that the suit was 
commenced maliciously and without probable cause. 112 
B. Maryland s Modern Abuse of Process Jurisprudence 
1. Walker v. American Security & Trust Co. of Washington, D. C. 
In 1964, the Court of Appeals of Maryland auspiciously inaugurated 
the Old Line State'sl13 modern era abuse of process jurisprudence in 
Walker v. American Security & Trust Co. of Washington, D. C.114 The 
Walker case included the following exposition: 
A tort action for abuse of process, on the one hand, and the 
tort actions for malicious prosecution and malicious use of 
process, on the other hand, are essentially different and in-
dependent actions. An action for abuse of process differs 
from actions for malicious prosecution and malicious use of 
process in that abuse of process is concerned with the im-
proper use of criminal or civil process in a manner not con-
templated by law after it has been issued, without the 
112. Berman, 308 Md. at 262, 518 A.2d at 727 ("In short, prior termination of 
proceedings in favor of the plaintiff in the abuse of process case is not an 
element of the tort."). 
113. See Maryland State Archives at www.mdarchives.state.md.us/msa/ 
mdmanual/olglance/html/nickname.html (last visited Feb. 13,2003) ("Ac-
cording to some historians, [General] George Washington bestowed the 
name 'Old Line State' and thereby associated Maryland with its regular line 
troops, the Maryland Line, who served courageously in many Revolutionary 
War battles."). 
114. 237 Md. 80, 205 A.2d 302 (1964). In Walker, a court appointed American 
Security & Trust Co. of Washington, D.C. (the "Trust Company") as conser-
vator of Alonsita Walker's person and estate. [d. at 83, 205 A.2d at 304. 
Shortly thereafter, Ms. Walker's son, Aldace Walker, without the knowledge 
or consent of the Trust Company, secretly took his mother from her Wash-
ington, D.C. apartment, where she had been receiving round-the-clock 
nursing care, to Webley, the mother's farm in Talbot County. [d. After the 
Trust Company filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to regain custody 
of Ms. Walker, a sheriff served the writ, and mother and son appeared 
before the Talbot County Circuit Court. [d. at 84, 205 A.2d at 305. The 
circuit court determined that Ms. Walker should remain at her farm "for 
the time being to afford the parties an opportunity to try to reconcile their 
differences amicably." [d. The Trust Company employed a nurse to remain 
with Ms. Walker at Webley, and dismissed the habeas corpus proceeding. 
[d. at 84-85, 205 A.2d at 305. Subsequently, Aldace Walker sued the Trust 
Company for abuse of process. [d. at 85, 205 A.2d at 305. In rejecting that 
claim, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reasoned: 
Here, where the conservator had legal custody of the plaintiff's 
mother, her removal from Washington to Talbot County absent the 
consent or approval of the conservator was sufficient to justify 
resorting to the writ of habeas corpus to determine the custodial 
rights of the respective parties. As the effort of the conservator to 
regain control of its ward under the writ was proper, no action 
would lie for malicious abuse of process. 
[d. at 88, 205 A.2d at 307. 
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necessity of showing lack of probable cause or termination of 
the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff, while actions for ma-
licious prosecution and malicious use of process are con-
cerned with maliciously causing civil or criminal process to 
issue for its ostensible purpose, but without probable 
cause. I 15 
2. Wesko v. G.E.M., Inc. 
In Wesko v. G.E.M., Inc., I 16 the Court of Appeals of Maryland eluci-
dated that the historical origins for the tort of abuse of process trace 






In England, an action on the case lay for malicious use of 
process until the enactment of the Statute of Marlbridge. 
The rationale of this statute, which awarded costs to a suc-
cessful tenant by way of amercement in actions brought by 
an overreaching landlord, would appear to have been later 
extended to cases where amercement was granted pro falso 
clamore. . . . Thereafter, for there to be a recovery, an arrest 
(malicious prosecution on criminal charges), a seizure of 
property (malicious use of civil process), or other special dam-
age (abuse of process) had to be shown. 1l8 
Jd. at 87, 205 A.2d at 306-07. 
272 Md. 192,321 A.2d 529 (1974). In Wesko, the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land rejected a debtor's claim for malicious use of process because the 
creditor's misconduct - the wrongful filing of an attachment - was merely a 
"clerical mistake ... not actuated by any improper motive or purpose" and 
the creditor's attorney dismissed the attachment as soon as he learned of 
the "goof." Id. at 199, 321 A.2d at 533. 
Id. at 195 n.1, 321 A.2d at 531 n.l. See generally David K Godschalk, Protected 
Petitioning or Unlawful Retaliation? The Limits of First Amendment Immunity for 
Lawsuits Under the Fair Housing Act, 27 PEPP. L. REv. 477 (2000) ("The Stat-
ute of Marlbridge ... includ[ed] the first provision.in English law permit-
ting the recovery of costs by a defendant in a civil action as a remedy for 
[malicious use of process]. The law enabled a defendant in a [malicious 
use of process] action to recover his costs and damages."). The Statute of 
Marlbridge, provided in relevant part as follows: 
And if any chief Lords do maliciously implead such feoffees, fain-
ing this case, namely, where the feoffments were made lawful and 
in good faith, then the feofees shall have their damages awarded, 
and their costs which they have sustained by occasion of the fore-
said plea, and the plaintiffs shall be grievously punished by 
amerciament. 
Id. at 490 n.47. Black's Law Dictionary defines "feoffment" as "the grant of a 
feud or fee; that is, a barony or knight's fee, for which certain services were 
due from the feoffee to the feoffor." See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 557 (5th 
ed. 1979). 
Wesko v. G.E.M., Inc., 272 Md. 192, 195 n.1, 321 A.2d 529, 531 n.1 (1974) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). Black's Law Dictionary defines 
"amercement" as "[A] money penalty in the nature of a fine imposed upon 
an officer for some misconduct or neglect of duty. At common law, it was 
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The Court of Appeals of Maryland thus recognized that proof of dam-
age other than an arrest or a seizure of property is sufficient to establish 
the tort of abuse of process. II9 
3. Berman v. Karvounis 
Mter noting the "considerable attention" paid by Maryland's appel-
late courts in recent years to the tort of abuse of process,120 in Berman 
v. KarvounisI2I the Court of Appeals of Maryland distilled the state's 
modern abuse of process jurisprudence as follows: 
asserted by the peers of the delinquent, or the affeerors, or imposed arbi-
trarily at the discretion of the court or the lord." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 
557 (5th ed. 1979). Individuals are amerced when they are "at the king's 
mercy with regard to the fine to be imposed." 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 1338 (Lewis ed. 1922). Black's Law Dictionary 
defines "pro falso clamare suo" as "[a] nominal amercement of a plaintiff for 
his false claim, which used to be inserted in a judgment for the defendant." 
See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 557 (5th ed. 1979). The Statute of Marlbridge 
is part of the "common law," which includes "all the statutory and case law 
background of England and the American colonies before the American 
Revolution." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 251 (5th ed. 1979); see also Pickett v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 365 Md. 67, 775 A.2d 1218 (2001). In Pickett, the 
court noted: 
That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law 
of England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course of that 
Law, and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed on 
the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six; and 
which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local 
and other circumstances, and have been introduced, used and 
practiced by the Courts of Law or Equity .... 
Id. at 89, 775 A.2d at 1231 (quoting Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration 
of Rights). But see Krashes v. White, 275 Md. 549, 555, 341 A.2d 798, 801 
(1975) ("[T]he plaintiff in a criminal malicious prosecution action need 
not prove any special damages, such as arrest or seizure of property."). 
119. Wesko, 272 Md. at 195, 321 A.2d at 53l. 
120. Berman v. Karvounis, 308 Md. 259, 260, 518 A.2d 726 (1987); see, e.g., Keys 
v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 303 Md. 397, 402, 494 A.2d 200, 202 (1985); 
Palmer Ford, Inc. v. Wood, 298 Md. 484, 485-86, 471 A.2d 297 (1984); 
Krashes v. White, 275 Md. 549, 555, 341 A.2d 798, 801-02 (1975). 
121. Berman involved a contract dispute between Demitrios Karvounis and Mal-
colm Berman. Berman, 308 Md. at 260-61, 518 A.2d at 72&-27. Karvounis 
filed twelve suits in two jurisdictions against Berman (the "Contract Law-
suits"), alleging that Berman fraudulently induced Karvounis to enter into 
certain contracts, and seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 
261, 518 A.2d at 727. Prior to resolution of the Contract Lawsuits, Berman 
brought a separate suit in Baltimore City Circuit Court against Karvounis 
(the "Abuse of Process Lawsuit"), charging Karvounis with, inter alia, abuse 
of process. Id. The trial court dismissed Berman's abuse of process claim 
without prejudice, and Karvounis appealed. Id. The court of appeals ruled 
that the mere initiation of the Contract Lawsuits failed to demonstrate, as 
required to prove abuse of process, "a wilful act in the use of process not 
proper in the regular course of the proceeding." Id. at 264-65, 518 A.2d at 
728-29 (quoting W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAw OF TORTS, § 121 at 898 
(5th ed. 1984». The court stated that "here there are no facts to show how 
the process was used for any purpose other than the normal one of ob-
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The essential elements of abuse of process as the tort has 
developed, have been stated to be: first, an ulterior purpose, 
and second, a wilful act in the use of the process not proper 
in the regular conduct of the proceeding. Put otherwise: 
To sustain an action of abuse of process the plaintiff 
must show that: 
1. the defendant wilfully used process for an illegal 
purpose; 
2. to satisfY the defendant's ulterior motive; and 
3. the plaintiff was dama§ed by the defendant's per-
verted use of process.12 
In Berman, the court of appeals refined the damages element of 
abuse of process. By requiring proof of mere damages (as opposed to 
"special damages," a concept uniquely associated with malicious use of 
process), the court aligned Maryland with the minority of jurisdictions 
embracing the three-element version of the "Traditional Definition" 
of abuse of process.123 
4. One Thousand Fleet Ltd. Partnership v. Guerriero 
In One Thousand Fleet, the court of appeals disregarded its modem 
precedents.124 Overlooking Maryland's rich treasure trove of modern 
abuse of process jurisprudence, 125 the high court instead relied on its 
"confused" nineteenth century case law to defend eviscerating the 
venerable tort of abuse of process by adding a sine qua non of "seizure 
or arrest."126 The One Thousand Fleet court disregarded its modern 
precedents concerning the damages element of abuse of process, 






taining personal jurisdiction over [Berman]." Berman, 308 Md. at 265, 518 
A.2d at 729. In sum, the Berman opinion illustrated the often-stated rule 
that the mere initiation of suit, no matter how unfounded, cannot amount 
to an abuse of process. [d.; see also supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
Berman, 308 Md. at 262,518 A.2d at 727 (citing R.P. GILBERT ET AL., MARY-
LAND TORT LAw HANDBOOK § 5.4 (1986); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE 
LAw OF TORTS, § 121 at 898 (5th ed. 1984)). 
[d.; accord Palmer Ford, Inc. v. Wood, 65 Md. App. 390, 397-98, 500 A.2d 
1055, 1059 (1985) (observing that when criminal or civil process has been 
"perverted by misapplication to an end for which that process was never 
intended, the abuser is liable for all the consequences that reasonably re-
sult from the process."). See supra note 58. 
See One Thousand Fleet at 45-48, 694 A.2d at 959-6l. 
See Berman, 308 Md. at 262,518 A.2d at 727; Wesko, 272 Md. at 195 n.1, 321 
A.2d at 531 n.l (recognizing that abuse of process damages other than an 
arrest or a seizure of property are sufficient to establish the tort); Walker v. 
Am. Sec. & Trust Co. of Washington, D.C., 237 Md. 80, 87, 205 A.2d 302, 
306 (1964) ("A tort action for abuse of process, on the one hand, and the 
tort actions for malicious prosecution and malicious use of process, on the 
other hand, are essentially different and independent actions."); Palmer 
Ford, 65 Md. App. at 397-98, 500 A.2d at 1059. 
One Thousand Fleet, 346 Md. at 45-46, 694 A.2d at 960 (citing Bartlett v. 
Christhilf, 69 Md. 219, 231, 14 A. 518, 522 (1888)). 
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property, were sufficient to establish the tort. I27 Instead, the One 
Thousand Fleet court reached back more than a century to its funda-
mentally flawed Bartlett opinion to justify engrafting the "seizure or 
arrest" requirement onto the "Traditional Definition" of abuse of pro-
cess. I28 In one fell swoop, the court of appeals consigned abuse of 
process to the trash bin of Maryland's legal history because in only 
rare cases can an abuse of process victim satisfy the seizure or arrest 
element. I29 In the wake of One Thousand Fleet, even the most egre-
gious perversions of judicial machinery face no tort remedy in 
Maryland. 
As ostensible justification for debilitating the tort of abuse of pro-
cess, Maryland's high court relied not only on the flawed Bartlett opin-
ion, but also the jurisprudence of five "sister states" that it 
mischaracterized as "in accord" with its decision.I30 This Article next 
will review the jurisprudence of the five so-called "sister states." 
IV. THE ONE THOUSAND FlEET COURT MISCHARACTERIZED 
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF FIVE SO-CALLED "SISTER 
STATES" (MONTANA, ILLINOIS, OREGON, KENTUCKY, AND 
NEW MEXICO). 
The One Thousand Fleet court defended its decision to engraft a 
"seizure or arrest" requirement onto Maryland's "Traditional Defini-
tion" of abuse of process by errantly asserting that" [t] he law of several 
sister states is in accord."I3I For that assertion to be correct would 
require at least three other states to be "in accord" with Maryland's 
decision to require a seizure or arrest as an essential element of abuse 
of process. I32 However, none of the five so-called "sister states" cited 
in One Thousand Fleet currently follow Maryland's rigid approach. I33 
To the contrary, recent case law in each of the five "sister states" rec-
ognize the "Traditional Definition" of abuse of process. I34 
A. Montana 
The first "sister state" relied upon as being in accord with Maryland 
law in One Thousand Fleet was Montana. I35 The Court of Appeals of 
127. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
128. See supra note 24 and accompanying text; see infra 129 and accompanying 
text. 
129. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
130. See infra Part IV. 
131. One Thousand Fleet, 346 Md. at 46, 694 A.2d at 960. 
132. Webster's defines "several" as "more than two but fewer than many." See RAN-
DOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1227 (Robert B. Costello ed., 
1992). 
133. See infra Part IV. 
134. See supra note 24. 
135. One Thousand Fleet, 346 Md. at 46, 694 A.2d at 960. 
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Maryland, however, erred in characterizing Hopper v. Drysda[el36 as 
"applying Montana law."137 To the contrary, the Hopper case applied 
Pennsylvania law, not Montana law. 138 Specifically, the Hopper court 
cited to an anachronistic, 1963 Pennsylvania precedent139 that repre-
sents the current approach of neither Pennsylvania nor Montana. In 
fact, recent cases in both Montana and Pennsylvania recognize the 
"Traditional Definition" of abuse of process.140 In sum, the One Thou-
sand Fleet court incorrectly characterized Montana as "in accord" with 
Maryland's adoption of an ultraconservative definition of abuse of 
process.141 
B. Illinois 
The second "sister state" relied upon in One Thousand Fleet was Illi-
nois.142 Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals of Maryland also erred 
when it characterized Illinois as "in accord" with One Thousand Fleet's 
ultra-narrow definition of abuse of process. 143 In reality, recent Illi-
nois case law recognizes the "Traditional Definition" of abuse of pro-
cess. 144 However, the court of appeals relied on an older, 
fundamentally flawed, and anomalous intermediate appellate deci-
sion, Withall v. Capitol Federal Savings of America, 145 that required the 
rigid "arrest or seizure" element.146 The Withal! court mistakenly justi-
136. 524 F. Supp. 1039 (D. Mont. 1981). 
137. One Thousand Fleet, 346 Md. at 46, 694 A.2d at 960. 
138. See Hopper, 524 F. Supp. at 1041. 
139. Id. (citing Mina v. Melnick, 222 F. Supp. 92 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (applying Penn-
sylvania law». 
140. Todi v. Stursberg, No. 01-2539, 2001 u.s. Dist. LEXIS 20098, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 
Dec. 4, 2001) (applying Pennsylvania law) ("To establish a claim for abuse 
of process it must be shown that a litigant (l) used a legal process against 
another, (2) primarily to accomplish a purpose for which the process was 
not designed; and (3) harm has been caused to the other party."); 
Courtnage v. City of Havre, 8 P.3d 124, No. 99-690, slip op. at 2 (Mont. May 
25, 2000) ("In order to establish an abuse of process claim, a plaintiff must 
prove (1) an ulterior purpose, and (2) a willful act in the use of process 
which is not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding."). 
141. See One Thousand Fleet, 346 Md. at 46, 694 A.2d at 960. 
142. Id. 
143. See id. 
144. See Evans v. West, 935 F.2d 922, 923 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting McGrew v. 
Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 497 N.E.2d 424, 429 (Ill. App. 1986» 
("Under Illinois law, a plaintiff pleading abuse of process must establish the 
existence of both 'an ulterior purpose or motive for the use of regular 
court process,' and 'an act in the use of process not proper in the regular 
prosecution of a suit."'); see also Chambers v. The Habitat Co., No. 99-C-
2095, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4959, at *18 (N.D. Ill. 2002) ("Under Illinois 
law, the elements for a claim of abuse of process are: (l) existence of an 
ulterior motive or purpose, and (2) some act in the use of legal process not 
proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings."). 
145. One Thousand Fleet, 346 Md. at 46, 694 A.2d at 960 (citing Withall v. Capitol 
Fed. Sav. of Am., 508 N.E.2d 363, 368 (Ill. App. 1987». 
146. Withall, 508 N.E.2d at 368. 
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fied its decision by relying on precedent that mischaracterized the 
preeminent Illinois Supreme Court decision of Bonney v. King. 147 
In Bonney v. King,148 the Illinois court could not have been more 
clear in identifYing abuse of process as having but "two elements": 
"First, the existence of an ulterior purpose; and second, an act in the 
use of process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceed-
ing."149 Long after the pellucid Bonney v. King opinion, the Illinois 
intermediate appellate court inexplicably mischaracterized Bonney as 
requiring seizure or arrest as an element of abuse of process. 150 Con-
trary to the misguided opinion relied upon by the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, however, more recent Illinois jurisprudence shows that Illi-
nois indeed recognizes the "Traditional Definition" of abuse of 
process. 151 
C. Oregon 
The third "sister state" relied upon in One Thousand Fleet was Ore-
gon. 152 The Maryland court mischaracterized Oregon as "in accord" 
with its decision to add the "seizure or arrest" element. 153 In fact, 
Oregon recognizes the "Traditional Definition" of abuse of pro-
cess.154 In Reynolds v. Givens/55 the fundamentally flawed, intermedi-
147. Id. (citing John Allan Co. v. Brandow, 207 N.E.2d 339 (Ill. App. 1965)). 
The Brandow court incorrectly characterized Bonney v. King as stating that 
an abuse of process action will not lie without an arrest or seizure. Id. 
148. 66 N.E. 377 (Ill. 1903). In Bonney, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's 
institution of an unfounded action against him "to recover upon a pre-
tended note," had damaged his "credit and standing" among lenders. Id. 
The Illinois court's holding focused on the tort of "malicious prosecution 
of a civil suit without probable cause," rather than abuse of process. Id. at 
377-78. The court properly identified the elements of an action for "mali-
cious prosecution of a civil suit without probable cause" as including an 
"arrest of the person or seizure of the property, or other special injury" and 
favorable termination of the underlying lawsuit. Id. Because there was no 
allegation that the plaintiff had been arrested or had his property seized, 
and because the underlying lawsuit still remained "pending in the courts 
for trial," the Bonney court correctly dismissed the claim for malicious pros-
ecution of a civil suit without probable cause. Id. at 378. 
149. Id. 
150. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
151. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
152. One Thousand Fleet, 346 Md. at 46, 694 A.2d at 960. 
153. See id. at 45-46, 694 A.2d at 960. 
154. Acwrd Columbia County v. Sande, 28 P.3d 657 (Or. App. 2001). The Ore-
gon courted noted that: 
Under Oregon law, the tort of "abuse of process" is the perversion 
of a process that is regular on its face to a purpose for which the 
process is not intended .... We have described it as "the use of the 
process as a club by which to extort something unrelated to the 
process from the other party." ... As such, to plead a claim for 
abuse of process, a plaintiff must allege some ulterior purpose, un-
related to the process, and a willful act in the use of the process 
that is not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. 
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ate appellate case relied upon in One Thousand Fleet, the Oregon court 
made the common mistake of confusing the tort of abuse of process 
with the tort of malicious use of process. 156 In addition, the Reynolds 
court mistakenly relied upon Illinois precedent that mischaracterized 
the preeminent Illinois Supreme Court decision, Bonney v. King. 157 
Contrary to the Reynolds158 opinion relied upon by the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland, more recent Oregon jurisprudence shows that Ore-
gon unequivocally recognizes the "Traditional Definition" of abuse of 
process. 159 
D. Kentucky 
The fourth "sister state" relied upon in One Thousand Fleet was Ken-
tucky.160 The court of appeals, however, erroneously characterized 
Kentucky as "in accord" with One Thousand Fleet's ultra-narrow defini-
tion of abuse of process. 161 In fact, recent Kentucky case law recog-
nizes the "Traditional Definition" of abuse of process. 162 Raine v. 
Drasin,163 the older Kentucky case relied upon in One Thousand Fleet, 
did obtusely refer to "an injury to the person or his property" as a 
requirement for abuse of process. 164 Ultimately, given the opportu-
nity to comprehensively redefine the "essential elements"165 of abuse 
Id. at 661 (citations omitted); see Larsen v. Credit Bureau, Inc. of Ga., 568 
P.2d 657, 658 (Or. 1977) (identifying the "essential elements" of abuse of 
process as: "first, an ulterior purpose, and second, a wilful act in the use of 
the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding"). 
155. 695 P.2d 946 (Or. App. 1985). 
156. See id. at 950-51. In Reynolds, the alleged abuse of process consisted of the 
initiation of "frivolous and vindictive lawsuits." Id. at 950. However, the 
mere initiation of litigation, no matter how frivolous, cannot be an abuse of 
process. See supra notes 38-40, 98 and accompanying text. 
157. See John Allan Co. v. Brandow, 207 N.E.2d 339, 343 (Ill. App. 1965) (mis-
characterizing Bonney as stating that an abuse of process action will not lie 
without an arrest or seizure). 
158. 695 P.2d 946. 
159. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
160. One Thousand Fleet, 346 Md. at 46, 694 A.2d at 960. 
161. Id. 
162. Accord Pennington v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 710, 713-14 
(E.D. Ky. 2000). The Pennington court stated that: 
Under Kentucky law, a prima facie showing of abuse of process re-
quires that (1) the process instituted by the defendant was for some 
ulterior purpose, and (2) that the defendant instituting the process 
must have performed a willful act in using the process that is not a 
part of the regular conduct of the proceeding. 
Id.; see Simpson v. Lay tart, 962 S.W.2d 392, 394-95 (Ky. 1998) ("The essen-
tial elements of an action for abuse of process are (1) an ulterior purpose 
and (2) a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular 
conduct of the proceeding."). 
163. 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981). 
164. Id. at 902. 
165. Simpson, 962 S.W.2d at 394-95. 
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of process, the Supreme Court of Kentucky, in Simpson v. Lay tart, 166 
opted not to include "injury to person or property" as an element, 
thereby restoring Kentucky's status as a jurisdiction recognizing the 
"Traditional Definition" of abuse of process. 167 
E. New Mexico 
New Mexico was the fifth "sister state" relied upon in One Thousand 
Fleet. 168 Unfortunately, the court of appeals misconstrued Hertz Corp. v. 
Paloni169 as "in accord" with its decision to impose "seizure or arrest" 
as an element of abuse of process. 170 To the contrary, the Hertz opin-
ion did not prescribe "seizure or arrest" as an element. 171 In fact, only 
proof of "damages" is required to prove malicious abuse of process in 
New Mexico. 172 This is a far cry from the rigid "seizure or arrest" 
element. 173 
v. IMPORTANT PUBLIC POLICIES SUPPORT THE TRADI-
TIONAL DEFINITION OF ABUSE OF PROCESS 
A. The Traditionally Defined Tort of Abuse of Process Poses an Effective De-
terrent Against Oppressive Litigation Tactics, Thereby Facilitating a Level 
Playing Field. 
An indispensable attribute of the abuse of process tort lies in its 
value as an "effective deterrent against Rambo litigation tactiCS."174 
Because abuse of process is an intentional tort,175 the prospect of a 
jury awarding punitive damages provides a strong disincentive against 












962 S.W.2d 392. 
See id. at 394; see also supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
One Thousand Fleet, 346 Md. at 46, 694 A.2d at 960. 
619 P.2d 1256 (N.M. App. 1980). 
One Thousand Fleet, 346 Md. at 45-46, 694 A.2d at 960. 
In Hertz, the New Mexico intermediate appellate court rejected an abuse of 
process claim because the institution of a replevin action "did not result in 
any damage" to the plaintiff. Hertz, 619 P.2d at 1259. Thus, the Hertz plain-
tiff failed to satisfy an essential element of abuse of process, namely, that 
"the plaintiff must suffer damages." Id. In dicta, the Hertz opinion did note 
that courts had "sometimes" required "an unlawful interference with the 
plaintiff's person or property." Id. However, in Devaney v. Thriftway Market-
ing Corp., the New Mexico Supreme Court resolved any ambiguity raised by 
the Hertz opinion's dicta by holding that the malicious abuse of process tort 
merely requires proof of "damages." 953 P.2d 277, 289 (N.M. 1997). 
Devaney, 953 P.2d at 288. 
Id. 
McAuliffe, supra note 7, at 19. 
See Cuillo v. Shupnick, 815 F. Supp. 133, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (observing 
that abuse of process is an intentional tort). 
See McAuliffe, supra note 7, at 19. The author states that: 
The fact that abuse of process and malicious prosecution are both 
intentional torts should not prove to be a factor in curtailing their 
use as weapons against abusive litigation practices. The gimmicks 
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litigants are wary when the possibility of punitive damages is present. 
In contrast, they may view the threat of relatively de minimus court-
imposed attorney fee sanctionsl77 as a mere "cost of doing busi-
ness,"178 an acceptable quid pro quo for the ability to employ scorched-
earth litigation schemes. Although trial judges may discretionarily im-
pose limited attorney fee awards,179 only a tort action entitles an abuse 
of process victim to a jury determination of consequential and puni-
tive damages. 180 In sum, trial court procedural sanctions are an inade-
quate substitute for abuse of process tort liability. Similarly, 
professional discipline plays little or no role in deterring misconduct 
in litigation. 181 On the other hand, civil liability for abuse of process 
Id. 
that satisfY the description of "Rambo" litigation tactics are rarely 
undertaken inadvertently or negligently. To the contrary, they are 
undertaken purposefully to wear down the opposition so as to 
achieve a resolution of a controversy on the basis of considerations 
that bear little or no relationship to its merits. 
177. See, e.g., MD. RULE 1-341. The rules states that: 
In any civil action, if the court finds that the conduct of any party 
in maintaining or defending any proceeding was in bad faith or 
without substantial justification the court may require the offend-
ing party or attorney advising the conduct or both of them to pay 
to the adverse party the costs of the proceeding and the reasonable 
expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred by the ad-
verse party in opposing it. 
Id.; see also supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
178. See infra note 179 accompanying text. Although court sanctions allow for 
an award of attorney's fees, they provide for neither consequential damages 
nor punitive damages. See infra note 179. 
179. See Wade, supra note 42, at 486 n.250 (noting that, unlike tort actions for 
malicious civil prosecution and abuse of process, Federal Rule 11 fails to 
allow the i~ured parties to recover for consequential damages such as emo-
tional distress). The article further states that: 
Id. 
The [Rule 11 J sanctions are within the proper function of the trial 
judge in the litigation itself, for the purpose of maintaining effi-
cient and orderly procedure in the litigation process, and it is re-
garded as appropriate to allocate money charges to compensate a 
party to the trial who has been put to unnecessary litigation ex-
pense. Consequential damages, however, would come within the 
scope of the guaranties of jury trial in [aJ tort action .... 
180. Id. at 486. 
181. See Roger C. Cramton, Furtheringjustice By Improving the Adversary System and 
Making Lawyers More Accountable, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 1599, 1610 (2002). 
The article states that: 
Professionalism or civility codes will have little substantial effect on 
current abuses of adversarialism, which are driven by deeply in-
grained attitudes of adversarial duty that are economically and psy-
chologically rewarding to trial lawyers in a society that is 
increasingly self-interested rather than public-interested. Conse-
quently, serious attention must be given to improving accountabil-
ity through ... civil liability. 
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protects the integrity of the judicial process and facilitates a level play-
ing field for all litigants. 182 
B. The Traditional Definition of Abuse of Process Promotes the Public Policy 
Favoring Free Access to the Courts. 
The potent deterrent posed by abuse of process tort liability pro-
tects litigants who otherwise may fall victim to their guileful oppo-
nents' extortionate tactics. But if the threshold to prove abuse of 
process claims is raised too high, and plaintiffs can no longer chal-
lenge an adversary's abusive misconduct, the right to free access to the 
courts becomes a hollow pretense.183 As one commentator cogently 
observed: 
[The tort of abuse of process] recognizes that the adversary 
system itself can promote injustice if one side has superior 
knowledge of the system and harbors the inclination to bend 
the rules. The tort of abuse of process is intended to limit 
wrongful adversarial conduct by clients and their attorneys. 
This limit is consistent with the public policy favoring open 
access to courts. 184 
The "Traditional Definition" of abuse of process,185 unfettered by 
the insuperable "seizure or arrest" element, promotes the public pol-
icy favoring free access to the courts. Moreover, abuse of process is an 
equal-opportunity tort; defendants as well as plaintiffs benefit from its 
salutary deterrent effect. 
c. 'The ''Arrest or Seizure" Element Is Unnecessary Because Abuse of Process 
Claims Pose No Threat of ''Endless Litigation. " 
The public policy concern for safeguarding against a series of end-
less litigation 186 finds expression in the high threshold required to 
Under present resource limitations and often ambiguous stan-
dards of ethics rules, professional discipline has little or no role in 
preventing misconduct in litigation .... 
. . . The initiative in this area must come from judges or legisla-
tors, who are more willing to create such standards in procedure 
codes and, at least sometimes, to enforce them once put in place. 
Standards embodied in procedural rules and subsequently en-
forced can have a powerful effect on lawyer conduct. The basic 
limitation, especially in jurisdictions where judges are subject to 
frequent elections, is that judges do not like to devote time to mat-
ters of lawyer conduct and hate to criticize members of the bar. 
Id. at 1610-11. 
182. Id. at 1611. 
183. See Van Patten, supra note 9, at 898-99. 
184. Id. at 908. 
185. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
186. One commentator described this objection as the "shuttlecock" argument: 
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prove a malicious use of process claim.187 Because malicious use of 
process claims may be asserted only after the conclusion of a favorably 
terminated suit,188 malicious use of process defendants incur the ex-
pense, time, and trouble that accompanies the defense of an entirely 
new litigation. In contrast, abuse of process defendants face far less 
expense and inconvenience because abuse of process claims may be 
resolved during the very same proceeding in which the alleged abuse 
occurred. 189 Therefore, the "prevention of endless litigation" justifi-
cation for narrowly circumscribing the tort of malicious use of process 
simply does not hold true for abuse of process. Imposing unnecessary 
impediments against the abuse of process tort, such as the seizure or 
arrest element, serves no public policy. Instead, it leaves under-
handed litigants free to abuse the judicial machinery with impunity, so 
long as they avoid the use of an arrest or seizure. 
VI. WHY DID THE COURT OF APPEALS CHOOSE TO EVISCER-
ATE THE TORT OF ABUSE OF PROCESS? 
One could posit that the Court of Appeals of Maryland opted to 
impose the eviscerating "seizure or arrest" element onto abuse of pro-
cess because the legal community simply prefers to minimize the de-
gree of redress available for misuse of the tools of litigation. 190 As one 
scholar observed, 'Judges do not like to devote time to matters of law-
yer conduct and hate to criticize members of the bar."191 Behind 
every litigant held liable for abuse of process stands a lawyer 







If the original defendant brings an action against the original 
plaintiff for malicious [use of process] and loses, the latter may 
then retaliate with a similar action, and the shuttlecock would be 
passed back and forth indefinitely. This is not just the product of 
an uncontrolled imagination; it has actually happened on occasion. 
Wade, supra note 42, at 455. 
See supra note 29 (discussing the elements of malicious use of process). 
Without substantial prophylactic safeguards imposed on the malicious use 
of process tort (e.g., the seizure or arrest damages element), every defen-
dant who successfully defends a suit might be tempted to turn around and 
sue for malicious use of process, thereby creating the potential for a series 
of endless litigation. See Van Patten, supra note 9, at 899. 
See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
Keller v. Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, 896 F. Supp. 1563, 1570-71 (D. Utah 
1995) ("[A]n abuse of process claim may be brought prior to termination 
of proceedings - most frequently as a counterclaim."). The Compulsory 
Counterclaim requirement advocated in this Article would spare abuse of 
process defendants the inconvenience and expense of multiple litigations. 
See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. 
See generally Cramton, supra note 181, at 1605 ("[H]igh court judges ... tend 
to reflect the entrenched attitudes, interests and constant influence of the 
organized bar."). 
Id. at 161l. 
Ajudge who refuses to dismiss an abuse of process claim incurs the displea-
sure of a lawyer or, perhaps, that lawyer'S entire firm. In addition, the law-
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In some cases, the lawyer may even suffer personal liability for abuse of 
process. 193 A desire to avoid such unpleasantness may help explain 
why judges who "hate to criticize members of the bar" would eviscer-
ate the tort of abuse of process. 194 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For important public policy reasons, courts must not shy away from 
their obligation to hold litigants accountable for willful abuses of the 
tools of litigation. It may be an onerous challenge to discern the dif-
ference between legitimately aggressive litigation tactics, on the one 
hand, and clearly abusive misconduct on the other. 195 But when the 
legal system rises to that challenge by recognizing a tort remedy for 
abuse of process, it fulfills its fundamental duty to facilitate a level 
playing field, free from extortionate chicanery. As the Supreme Court 
of Michigan sagely observed: 
As difficult as the process is, the fact is that trial judges, like 
trial lawyers ... are constantly called upon to resolve issues 
regarding what conduct permissibly pushes the system to the 
limit, and what is abuse Of the process. A system that im-
poses such refined and particularized responsibility rests on 
the notion that humankind has choices and that conse-
quences flow from one choice or the other. This is a moral 
postulate ingrained in our tradition.196 
yer has an unhappy client, a problem that only intensifies the lawyer's own 
dissatisfaction. 
193. See Inlet Assocs. v. Harrison Inn Inlet, Inc., 324 Md. 254, 269-70, 596 A.2d 
1049, lO57 (1991) ("For the purposes of this case, we will assume that an 
attorney could be personally liable for an abuse of process ... based on a 
suit filed on behalf of a client."). 
194. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
195. See W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional Responsibility, 75 NOTRE 
DAME L. REv. 1,61-62 (1999) (discussing the "difficult question" of how to 
permit lawyers to exercise their duty of loyalty to clients without allowing 
them to "degenerate into 'Rambo' advocates" who use "scorched earth liti-
gation tactics"); see also James M. Havey, Exploring the Benefits of Civility, NEW 
JERSEY LAw., Dec., 1996 at 24. The author states that: 
Id. 
There is a fine line between aggressive, effective lawyering and the 
"mad dog" litigator. The former zealously protects the interests of 
the client. He or she may demand from the adversary overdue ex-
pert reports so that the litigator's own expert will not be prejudiced 
in the preparation of a competing opinion. The latter abuses the 
rules of pretrial practice. He or she makes incessant and unneces-
sary motions for more specific interrogatories when a courteous 
but forceful letter may suffice. The "mad dog's" purpose is to over-
load the system, enervate the adversary, or drain the opposition's 
financial resources. His or her purpose may, regrettably, even be 
to "churn" the process in order to increase fees charged to his or 
her own client. 
196. People v. Adams, 425 N.W.2d 437, 445 (Mich. 1988). 
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Unfortunately, in Maryland, unscrupulous litigants can abuse pro-
cess without fear of the consequences that tort liability would impose. 
Therefore, Maryland's legislature should abrogate the One Thousand 
Fleet decision and restore abuse of process to an improved version of 
its status quo ante. Specifically, a statutorily reformulated tort of abuse 
of process should include the following components: 
1. An arrest of the person or a seizure of property is not 
required to establish the tort of abuse of process. 197 
2. Abuse of process consists of the following elements: first, 
that the defendant willfully used process after it has is-
sued in a manner not contemplated by law; second, that 
the defendant acted primarily to satisfy an ulterior mo-
tive; and third, that damages resulted from the defen-
dant's perverted use of process. 19B 
3. "Process," for purposes of abuse of process, encompasses 
the entire range of procedures incident to litigation, in-
cluding but not limited to motions, subpoenas, and 
discovery. 199 
4. Cognizable damages for abuse of process include all 
harm proximately resulting from the abuse.20o 
5. A tort claim for abuse of process must, if practicable, be 
asserted within the ve7. same litigation in which the al-
leged abuse occurred. 01 Courts should liberally exer-
cise discretion to rcermit amended pleadings asserting an 
abuse of process. 02 
6. A fifteen-day "Safe Harbor" applies to the tort of abuse of 
process.203 Thus, as a condition precedent to asserting 
an abuse of process claim, an alleged abuser of process 
must be given fifteen days prior notice of the intent to 
bring an abuse of process claim. During that period, the 
alleged abuser of process may avoid liability by aban-
doning the challenged conduct. Provided, however, lia-
bility may be avoided by abandoning the challenged 
conduct only in cases of "correctable mistakes," i.e., mis-
conduct that has not already resulted in damages. 
So long as the One Thousand Fleet decision stays in effect, Maryland 
litigants will remain vulnerable to coercive manipulations of judicial 
process. Remedial legislation can and should restore the tort of abuse 
of process to its erstwhile status as an effective deterrent against fla-
grant misuse of the tools of litigation. 
197. See supra notes 59, 125 and accompanying text. 
198. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
199. See supra Part ILB. 
200. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. 
201. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. 
202. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. 
203. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
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APPENDIX I 
FIFIY STATE SURVEY OF CASES IDENTIFYING THE ELEMENTS 
OF THE TORT OF ABUSE OF PROCESS 
Alabama: Willis v. Parker, 814 So. 2d 857, 865-66 (Ala. 2001) (quot-
ing C.C. &j., Inc. v. Hagood, 711 So. 2d 947, 950 (Ala. 1998)) (stating 
that, "[tJo establish a claim of abuse of process ... [oneJ must prove: 
(1) the existence of an ulterior purpose; (2) a wrongful use of process; 
and (3) malice," defined as seeking some result "not properly 
achieved by the process undertaken" and "for an end not germane" 
thereto). 
Alaska: Meidinger v. Koniag, Inc., 31 P.3d 77, 86 (Alaska 2001) 
("The tort of abuse of process consists of two elements: (1) an ulterior 
purpose; and (2) a willful act in the use of the process not proper in 
the regular conduct of the proceeding."). 
Arizona: Giles v. Marce, 988 P.2d 143, 146 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) 
(citing Nienstedt v. Wetzel, 651 P.2d 876 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982)) (not-
ing that the essential elements of the tort of abuse of process are "an 
ulterior purpose and a willful act in the use of judicial process not 
proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding"). 
Arkansas: S. Ark. Petroleum Co. v. Schiesser, 36 S.W.3d 317, 323 
(Ark. 2001) (citing Routh Wrecker Serv., Inc. v. Washington, 980 
S.W.2d 240 (1998)) (" [TJ he test of abuse of process is whether a judi-
cial process is used to extort or coerce. The key to the tort is the 
improper use of process after its issuance in order to accomplish a 
purpose for which the process was not designed."). 
California: Charles j. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Compo Ins. Fund, 
14 P.3d 234, 252 (Cal. 2001) (stating that an abuse of process claim 
involves the use of a procedure "incident to litigation"); Barquis v. 
Merchants Collection, Ass'n, 496 P.2d 817, 824 (Cal. 1972) ("[TJwo 
fundamental elements" comprise the tort of abuse of process: "first, 
an ulterior purpose, and second, a wilful act in the use of the process 
not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding."). 
Colorado: Lauren Corp. v. Century Geophysical Corp., 953 P.2d 
200, 202 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (citing James H. Moore & Assoc. Re-
alty, Inc. v. Arrowhead at Vail, 892 P.2d 367, 373 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1994)). The Colorado court stated that: 
[A] claim for abuse of process requires proof of the follow-
ing elements: (1) an ulterior purpose for the use of ajudicial 
proceeding; (2) willful action in the use of that process 
which is not proper in the regular course of the proceedings, 
i.e., use of a legal proceeding in an improper manner; and 
(3) resulting damage .... [The court also noted] a fourth 
element is added to the analysis when a claim for abuse of 
process is premised upon an action that constitutes an exer-
cise of a First Amendment right .... [In such cases] ... a 
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Id. 
claimant must also prove that the action taken lacked a rea-
sonable factual basis or, if so supported, that it lacked a cog-
nizable basis in law. 
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Connecticut: QSP, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 773 A.2d 906,919 
n.16 (Conn. 2001) (citing Schaefer v. O.K Tool Co., 148 A. 330 
(Conn. 1930». The Connecticut court stated that: 
Abuse of process is the misuse of process regularly issued to 
accomplish an unlawful ulterior purpose. The gravamen of 
the complaint is the use of process for a purpose not justified 
by law. The distinction between malicious use of process ... 
and abuse of process as tort actions is that in the former the 
wrongful act is the commencement of an action without legal 
justification, and in the latter it is in the subsequent 
proceedings. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Delaware: Ferguson v. Wesley College, Inc., No. C.A. 99C-07-109 
WTQ, 2000 WL 706833, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 23, 2000) (citing 
Read v. Carpenter, No. 95C-03-171, 1995 WL 567241 (Del. Super. Ct. 
June 8, 1995» ("The essential elements of a claim for abuse of process 
are: 1) a willful and improper act in the use of process; 2) any form of 
coercion; and 3) a collateral advantage to Defendants arising from 
said coercion."). 
Florida: Hardick v. Homol, 795 So. 2d 1107, 1111 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2001) (citing Thomas McKinnon Sec., Inc. v. Light, 534 So. 2d 
757, 760 (Fla. 1998». The court stated that: 
Id. 
A cause of action for abuse of process requires proof that: 
(1) the defendant made an illegal, improper, or perverted 
use of process; (2) the defendant had an ulterior motive or 
purpose in exercising the illegal, improper or perverted pro-
cess; and (3) the plaintiff was injured as a result of defen-
dant's action. 
Georgia: Carroll County Water Auth. v. Bunch, 523 S.E.2d 412, 413 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 51-7-81 (1999» ("Any 
person who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation, or pro-
curement of civil proceedings against another shall be liable for abu-
sive litigation if such person acts [with malice and without] substantial 
justification."). The court also noted that the notice requirement for 
the statutory tort of abusive litigation is "strictly construed in order to 
accomplish its overriding purpose to give a prospective defendant the 
chance to change position and avoid liability." Id.; see also Great West-
ern Bank v. Southeastern Bank, 507 S.E.2d 191, 192 (Ga. App. 1998) 
(describing statutory remedies available against those who abuse dis-
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covery, act in bad faith, are "stubbornly litigious," or cause an oppo-
nent "unnecessary trouble and expense"). 
Hawaii: Wong v. Panis, 772 P.2d 695, 699-700 (Haw. Ct. App. 1989) 
(citing Myers v. Cohen, 687 P.2d 6 (Haw. Ct. App. 1984)) ("The essen-
tial elements of abuse of process, as the tort has developed, have been 
stated to be: first, an ulterior purpose, and second, a wilful act in the 
use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the 
proceeding.") . 
Idaho: Beco Constr. Co. v. City of Idaho Falls, 865 P.2d 950, 954 
(Idaho 1993) (citing Badell v. Beeks, 765 P.2d 126, 159 (Idaho 1988)) 
("The essential elements of abuse of process are: (1) an ulterior, im-
proper purpose; and (2) a wilful act in the use of the process not 
proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding."). 
Illinois: Chambers v. Habitat Co., No. 99-C-2095, 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 4959, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2002) (citing Commerce Bank, 
N.A. v. Plotkin, 627 N.E.2d 746, 748 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)) ("Under Illi-
nois law, the elements for a claim of abuse of process are: (1) exis-
tence of an ulterior motive or purpose, and (2) some act in the use of 
legal process not proper in the regular prosecution of. the 
proceedings.") . 
Indiana: Reichhart v. City of New Haven, 674 N.E.2d 27,30 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1996) (citing Broadhurst v. Moenning, 633 N.E.2d 326 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1994)) ("In order to prevail upon a claim of abuse of process, a 
party must prove the following elements: 1) [a]n ulterior purpose; 
and 2) a willful act in the use of process not proper in the regular 
conduct of the proceeding."). 
Iowa: Gibson v. ITT Hartford Ins. Co., 621 N.W.2d 388, 398 (Iowa 
2001) (citing Fuller v. Local Union No. 106, 567 N.W.2d 419, 421 
(Iowa 1997)) ("An abuse-of-process claim has three elements: (1) the 
use of a legal process (2) in an improper or unauthorized manner (3) 
that causes the plaintiff to suffer damages as a result of that abuse."). 
Kansas: McShares, Inc. v. Barry, 970 P.2d 1005, 1015 (Kan. 1998) 
(citing Porter v. Stormont-Vail Hosp., 621 P.2d 411 (Kan. 1980)) 
("[The essential elements for abuse of process are] a knowingly illegal 
or improper use of the process done for the purpose of harassing or 
causing hardship, which resulted in damage [to the plaintiff]"). 
Kentucky: Simpson v. Lay tart, 962 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Ky. 1998) (cit-
ing Bonnie Braes Farms, Inc. v. Robinson, 598 S.W.2d 765 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1980)) ("The essential elements of an action for abuse of process 
are (1) an ulterior purpose and (2) a willful act in the use of the pro-
cess not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding."). 
Louisiana: Pipewelders Marine, Inc. v. Edwards, No. 96-3629, 1997 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13410, at *10-*11 (E.D. La. Aug. 29, 1997) (citing 
Simon v. Perret, 619 So. 2d 155 (La. Ct. App. 1993)) ("[Under Louisi-
ana law] [t]he two essential elements of abuse of process are an ulte-
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rior purpose and a wilful act in the use of the process not proper in 
the regular conduct of the proceeding."). 
Maine: Dumont v. Fleet Bank of Maine, 760 A.2d 1049, 1053 (Me. 
2000) (citing Potter, Prescott, Jamieson & Nelson, P.A. v. Campbell, 
708 A.2d 283, 286 (Me. 1998)). ("The elements necessary to establish 
an abuse of process are (1) 'the use of process in a manner improper 
in the regular conduct of the proceeding' and (2) 'the existence of an 
ulterior motive.'''). 
Maryland: McCauley v. Suls, 132 Md. App. 179, 191, 716 A.2d 1129, 
1135 (1998) (discussing that an abuse of process claimant must prove 
"first, that the defendants wilfully used process after it has issued in a 
manner not contemplated by law; second, that the defendants acted 
to satisfy an ulterior motive; and third, that damages resulted from the 
defendants' perverted use of process."). But see One Thousand Fleet 
Ltd. P'ship v. Guerriero, 346 Md. 29, 45, 694 A.2d 952, 960 (1997) 
(adding "seizure or arrest" element to Maryland's "Traditional Defini-
tion" of abuse of process). See supra note 27 (discussing the interrela-
tionship of the McCauley and One Thousand Fleet cases). 
Massachusetts: Ladd v. Polidoro, 675 N.E.2d 382,384 (Mass. 1997) 
(citing Gabriel v. Borowy, 85 N.E.2d 435 (Mass. 1949)) ("To constitute 
a cause of action for [abuse of process] it must appear that the process 
was used to accomplish some ulterior purpose for which it was not 
designed or intended, or which was not the legitimate purpose of the 
particular process employed."). 
Michigan: Amway Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., No. 1:98-CV-726, 
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2877, at *4-*5 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 2001) (cit-
ing Friedman v. Dozorc, 312 N.W.2d 585 (Mich. 1985)) (applying 
Michigan law) ("[T]o state a claim for abuse of process, a claimant 
must allege (1) an ulterior purpose and (2) an act in the use of the 
process which is improper in the regular prosecution of the proceed-
ing."). The court also quoted the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which 
describes the "gravamen" of the tort of abuse of process as "the misuse 
of process ... for any purpose other than that which it was designed to 
accomplish." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 682 cmt. 
a (1997)). 
Minnesota: Kellar v. VonHoltum, 568 N.W.2d 186, 192 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1997) (citing Hoppe v. Klapperich, 28 N.W.2d 780, 786 (Minn. 
1947) ). The court stated: 
Id. 
The essential elements for a cause of action for abuse of pro-
cess are the existence of an ulterior purpose and the act of 
using the process to accomplish a result not within the scope 
of the proceedings in which it was issued, whether such re-
sult might otherwise be lawfully obtained or not. 
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Mississippi: McClinton v. Delta Pride Catfish, Inc., 792 So. 2d 968, 
975 (Miss. 2001) (citing Moon v. Condere Corp., 690 So. 2d 1191, 
1197 (Miss. 1997». The court stated that: 
Id. 
The elements of abuse of process are: (1) an illegal and im-
proper perverted use of the process, which was neither war-
ranted nor authorized by the process; (2) ulterior motive or 
purpose of a person in exercising such illegal, perverted, or 
improper use of process; and (3) resulting damage or injury. 
Missouri: Howard v. Youngman, 81 S.W.3d 101, 118 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2002) (citing Pipefitters Health & Welfare Trust v. Waldo R., Inc., 760 
S.W.2d 196, 198 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988» ("The elements of abuse of 
process are (1) an illegal and unauthorized use of process; (2) an ulte-
rior motive for the use of that process; and (3) resulting damages."). 
Montana: Courtnage v. City of Havre, No. 99-690, 2000 Mont. LEXIS 
136, at *4 (Mont. May 25, 2000) (citing Brault v. Smith, 679 P.2d 236, 
240 (Mont. 1984» ("In order to establish an abuse of process claim, a 
plaintiff must prove (1) an ulterior purpose, and (2) a willful act in 
use of the process which is not proper in the regular conduct of the 
proceeding.") . 
Nebraska: Gordon v. Cmty. First State Bank, 587 N.W.2d 343, 351 
(Neb. 1998) (citing Vybiral v. Schildhauer, 265 N.W. 241, 244 (Neb. 
1936». The court stated that: 
Id. 
"Abuse of process" ... means the perversion of it, i.e., accom-
plishing some illegal object or purpose for which such pro-
cess was not legally intended .... "[T]o make out a cause of 
action for abuse of process, the plaintiff must prove irregular 
steps taken under cover of the process after its issuance, and 
damage resulting therefrom ." 
... Historically, the tort of abuse of process "evolved as a 
'catch-all' category to cover improper uses of the judicial ma-
chinery that did not fit within the earlier established, but 
narrowly circumscribed, action of malicious [use of 
process] ." 
Nevada: LaMantia v. Redisi, 38 P.3d 877, 879 (Nev. 2002) ("[T]he 
elements of an abuse of process claim are: (1) an ulterior purpose by 
the defendants other than resolving a legal dispute, and (2) a willful 
act in the use of the legal process not proper in the regular conduct of 
the proceeding."). 
New Hampshire: Long v. Long, 611 A.2d 620, 623 (N.H. 1992) ("A 
party claiming abuse of process must prove the following elements: 
(1) a person used (2) legal process, whether criminal or civil, (3) 
against the party (4) primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is 
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not designed and (5) caused harm to the party (6) by the abuse of 
process.") . 
New Jersey: Bergen v. Gervasi, No. 98-1475, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
20755, at *14 (D.N]. Nov. 23, 1998) (citing Harmon v. Holmes, 712 F. 
Supp. 451, 454 n.6 (D.N]. 1978» (applying New Jersey law). The 
New Jersey court stated: 
Id. 
Abuse of process has only two elements. First, defendant 
must have set in motion legal process for an improper ulte-
rior purpose, and second, in causing process to issue, defen-
dant must have committed a willful act that perverts the 
normal conduct of the proceeding in order to accomplish an 
improper purpose. 
New Mexico: Devaney v. Thriftway Mktg. Corp., 953 P.2d 277,283 
(N .M. 1997). The court defined the tort of "malicious abuse of pro-
cess" by the following elements: 
Id. 
(1) the initiation of judicial proceedings against the plaintiff 
by the defendant; (2) an act by the defendant in the use of 
process other than such as would be proper in the regular 
prosecution of the claim; (3) a primary motive by the defen-
dant in misusing the process to accomplish an illegitimate 
end; and (4) damages. In short, there must be both a misuse 
of the power of the judiciary by a litigant and a malicious 
motive. 
New York: Labensky v. Rozzi, No. 98-7512, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 
4241, at *4 (2d Cir. Mar. 15, 1999) (citing Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d 
73, 80 (2d Cir. 1994». The court stated that: 
Id. 
In New York, a malicious abuse of process claim lies against a 
defendant who (1) employs regularly issued legal process to 
compel performance or forbearance of some act (2) with in-
tent to do harm without excuse or justification (3) in order 
to obtain a collateral objective that is outside the legitimate 
ends of the process. 
North Carolina: Martin v. Parker, 563 S.E.2d 216, 219 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2002) (quoting Fowle v. Fowle, 140 S.E.2d 398, 401 (N.C. 1965» 
("The North Carolina Supreme Court has defined 'abuse of process' 
as 'the misuse of legal process for an ulterior purpose. It consists in 
the malicious misuse or misapplication of that process after issuance 
to accomplish some purpose not warranted or commanded by the 
·t "') WTI .. 
North Dakota: Wachter v. Gratech Co., 608 N.W.2d 279, 287 (N.D. 
2000). The court stated that: 
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The essential elements of abuse of process, as the tort has 
developed, have been stated to be: first, an ulterior purpose, 
and second, a wilful act in the use of the process not proper 
in the regular conduct of the proceeding. Some definite act 
or threat not authorized by the process, or aimed at an objec-
tive not legitimate in the use of the process, is required. 
Ohio: Nationwide Ins. Enter. v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., No. 
0IAP-1223, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 3082, at *19 (Ohio Ct. App. June 
20, 2002) (quoting Yaklevich v. Kemp, Schaeffer & Rowe Co., L.P.A., 
626 N.E.2d 115, 118 (Ohio 1994». The Ohio court stated that: 
Id. 
[T] he elements of a claim for abuse of process are: (1) that a 
legal proceeding has been set in motion in proper form and 
with probable cause; (2) that the proceeding has been per-
verted to attempt to accomplish an ulterior purpose for 
which it was not designed; and (3) that direct damage has 
resulted from the wrongful use of process. 
Oklahoma: Callaway v. Parkwood Vill., L.L.C., 1 P.3d 1003, 1004 
(Okla. 2000) (quoting Greenberg v. Wolfberg, 890 P.2d 895, 905 
(Okla. 1994» ("The elements of an abuse of process claim are '(1) 
the improper use of the court's process (2) primarily for an ulterior or 
improper purpose (3) with resulting damage to the plaintiff asserting 
the misuse."'). 
Oregon: Columbia County v. Sande, 28 P.3d 657,661 (Or. Ct. App. 
2001) (citing Larsen v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 568 P.2d 657 (Or. 1977». 
The court stated that: 
Under Oregon law, the tort of 'abuse of process' is the per-
version of a process that is regular on its face to a purpose 
for which the process is not intended. We have described it 
as "the use of the process as a club by which to extort some-
thing unrelated to the process from the other party." As 
such, to plead a claim for abuse of process, a plaintiff must 
allege some ulterior purpose, unrelated to the process, and a 
willful act in the use of the process that is not proper in the 
regular conduct of the proceeding. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
Pennsylvania: Todi v. Stursberg, No. 01-2539, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
20098, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 2001) (applying Pennsylvania law) 
(quoting Rosen v. American Bank of Rolla, 627 A.2d 190, 192 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1993» ("To establish a claim for abuse of process it must 
be shown that a [litigant] (1) used a legal process against [another], 
(2) primarily to accomplish a purpose for which the process was not 
designed; and (3) harm has been caused to the [other party]."). 
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Rhode Island: Toste Farm Corp. v. Hadbury, Inc., 782 A.2d 901, 907 
(R.I. 2002) (quoting Clyne v. Doyle, 740 A.2d 781, 783 (R.I. 1999)) 
("To show abuse of process, a plaintiff must demonstrate that 'a legal 
proceeding, although set in motion in proper form, becomes per-
verted to accomplish an ulterior or a wrongful purpose for which it 
was not designed.'''). 
South Carolina: Hainer v. Am. Med. Int'l, Inc., 492 S.E.2d 103, 107 
(S.C. 1997) (citing Huggins v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 153 S.E.2d 
693 (S.C. 1967)) ("The essential elements of abuse of process are an 
ulterior purpose and a willful act in the use of the process not proper 
in the conduct of the proceeding."). 
South Dakota: Specialty Mills, Inc. v. Citizens State Bank, 558 
N.W.2d 617, 623 (S.D. 1997) (citing Meissner v. All Dakota Ins. As-
socs., Inc., 515 N.W.2d 198, 200 (S.D. 1994)). The court stated that: 
[d. 
The essential elements of [abuse of process] are 1) an ulte-
rior purpose, and 2) an act in the use of process which is 
improper in the regular prosecution of the proceeding. 
[A] buse of process differs from [malicious use of process] in 
that it is not necessary to show that the action in which the 
process was used was without probable cause or that it termi-
nated favorably to the plaintiff. 
Tennessee: Givens v. Mullikin, 75 S.W.3d 383, 400 (Tenn. 2002) 
(citing Bell ex rei Snyder, 986 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Tenn. 1999)). The 
court stated that: 
[d. 
[T] he gist of the tort is not commencing an action or caus-
ing process to issue without justification, but misusing, or 
misapplying process justified in itself for an end other than 
that which it was designed to accomplish .... To this end, a 
plaintiff must establish by evidence two elements to recover 
for abuse of process: (1) the existence of an ulterior motive; 
and (2) an act in the use of process other than such as would 
be proper in the regular prosecution of the charge. 
Texas: Laparade v. Rivera, No. 01-99-00723-CV, 2002 Tex. App. 
LEXIS 3487, at *26 nA (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Graham v. Mary 
Kay Inc., 25 S.W.3d 749, 756 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000)). The Texas court 
stated that: 
[d. 
The elements of abuse of process are (1) the defendant 
made an illegal, improper, or perverted use of the process, a 
use neither warranted nor authorized by the process, (2) the 
defendant had an ulterior motive or purpose in exercising 
such iUegal, perverted, or improper use of the process, and 
(3) plaintiff was damaged as a result of the illegal act. 
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Utah: Gilbert v. Ince, 981 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah 1999) (quoting RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 (1997» ("[The abuse of process 
comprises one of the] three separate categories of similar but distinct 
torts involving abusive manipulation of public judicial resources ... . 
[A] buse of process applies to '[0] ne who uses a legal process .. . 
against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not 
designed.' "). 
Vennont: Jacobsen v. Garza, 542 A.2d 265, 268 (Vt. 1988) ("[A] 
plaintiff alleging the tort of abuse of process must plead and prove: 1) 
an illegal, improper or unauthorized use of a court process; 2) an 
ulterior motive or an ulterior purpose; and 3) resulting damage to the 
plaintiff.") . 
Virginia: Donohoe Constr. Co. v. Mount Vernon Assocs., 369 S.E.2d 
857, 862 (Va. 1988) ("To sustain a cause of action for abuse of pro-
cess, a plaintiff must plead and prove: (l) the existence of an ulterior 
purpose; and (2) an act in the use of the process not proper in the 
regular prosecution of the proceedings."). 
Washington: Walker v. City of Kennewick, No. 19610-1-III, 2001 
Wash. App. LEXIS 2540, at *19 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Mark v. 
Williams, 724 P.2d 428 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986» ("The essential ele-
ments of an abuse of process claim are: (l) the existence of an ulte-
rior purpose to accomplish an object not within the proper scope of 
the process; and (2) an act in the use of legal process not proper in 
the regular prosecution of the proceedings."). 
West Virginia: Southern States Coop. Inc. v. I.S.P. Co., Inc., 198 F. 
Supp. 2d 807, 816 (N.D.W. Va. 2002) (quoting Preisner v. MacQueen, 
352 S.E.2d 22 (W. Va. 1985». The court stated that: 
The tort of abuse of process is well-grounded in West Vir-
ginia law .... [T]he West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals explained the claim of abuse of process as follows: "The 
distinctive nature of an action for abuse of process ... is that 
it lies for the improper use of a regularly issued process, not 
for maliciously causing process to issue . . . . 
The authorities are practically unanimous in holding that 
to maintain the action for abuse of process there must be 
proof of a willful and intentional abuse or misuse of the pro-
cess for the accomplishment of some wrongful object - an 
intentional and willful perversion of it to the unlawful injury 
of another .... 
In an action for abuse of process, as distinguished from an 
action for [malicious use of process], it is not necessary to 
aver and prove the termination of the proceeding in which 
the process was issued. It is sufficient that one party has will-
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Wisconsin: Heil Co. v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 937 F. 
Supp. 1355, 1363 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (citation omitted) (The court 
stated that under Wisconsin law, "[t]he tort of abuse of process has 
two essential elements: 'a willful act in the use of process not proper 
in the regular conduct of the proceedings and an ulterior motive.'''). 
Wyoming: Meyer v. Conlon, 162 F.3d 1264, 1274 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(citing Bosler v. Shuck, 714 P.2d 1231, 1234 (Wyo. 1986)) ("To show 
abuse of process in Wyoming, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) 'an 
ulterior purpose, and (2) the wilful act in the use of the process which 
is not proper in the regular conduct of the legal proceeding."'). 
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APPENDIX II 
CASE LAW SURVEY: TWENTY-THREE COURT DECISIONS FIND-
ING THE ELEMENTS OF ABUSE OF PROCESS TO BE SATISFIED 
Arizona: Nienstedt v. Wetzel, 651 P.2d 876, 876-82 (Ariz. App. 
1982). The Neinstedt court upheld the jury award of compensatory 
and punitive damages for abuse of process based on evidence that, in 
prior litigation between neighboring property owners concerning 
sharing the cost of building a retaining wall, the abuse of process de-
fendant's "primary purpose" was to subject his neighbors to "excessive 
litigation expenses." Id. The evidence showed that the abuse of pro-
cess defendant had told his neighbors that: 
[throughout the case,] he was going to make ... [their] at-
torney a rich man; that he ... could break people financially 
(impliedly through subjecting them to legal fees and ex-
penses); and, that because he was a lawyer representing him-
self it would not be necessary for him to incur similar fees 
and expenses. 
Id.; see also Rebecca Porter, Jury Punishes Allstate for "Scorched-Earth" Tac-
tics, TRIAL, Dec. 2001, at 70 (describing a jury awarding damages to 
plaintiffs who sued Allstate Insurance for abuse of process because of 
the insurer's practice of using "scorched earth litigation tactics" for 
the ulterior purpose of coercing claimants in minor-impact crashes to 
accept low settlement offers). 
California: Barquis v. Merch. Collection Ass'n, 496 P.2d 817, 839 
(Cal. 1972) (finding that in a class action suit, evidence showed a 
gross abuse of process by a collection agency that knowingly filed stat-
utorily inadequate "form complaints" in improper, distant counties, 
for the ulterior purpose of impairing class members' ability to defend 
those actions, and with the intent, and effect, of obtaining default 
judgments and coercing payments from debtors); see also Templeton 
Feed & Grain v. Ralston Purina Co., 446 P.2d 152, 155 (Cal. 1968) 
(finding that it was an abuse of process for a mortgagee to procure the 
seizure of turkeys, when it knew or should have known it was not enti-
tled to possession of the turkeys in order to force the payment of an-
other's debt); Younger v. Solomon, 113 Cal. Rptr. 113, 117 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1974) (holding that summary judgment on abuse of process 
claim was improper where an issue of fact existed as to whether cross-
defendant used discovery process to disclose material to injure appel-
lant's reputation and disclosure was not reasonably related to underly-
ing action). 
Colorado: Aztec Sound Corp. v. Western States Leasing Co., 510 
P.2d 897, 899-900 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (affirming judgment in favor 
of an abuse of process claim against a creditor that sought to attach 
plaintiffs manufacturing equipment despite the fact that the plaintiff 
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had fully repaid the loan); see also Lauren Corp. v. Century Geophysi-
cal Corp., 953 P.2d 200, 203 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding an 
abuse of process judgment against a plaintiff who had summonsed its 
opponent to defend a lawsuit in a distant forum despite knowledge 
that the distant forum lacked personal jurisdiction). 
Illinois: Wanzer v. Bright, 52 Ill. 35, 42 (1869) (affirming abuse of 
process judgment against a creditor that misused a summons by fraud-
ulently inducing a debtor to come within the jurisdiction of the court 
to render him amenable to its process); see also Lexecon, Inc. v. Mil-
berg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, No. 92 C 7768, 1999 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 917, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 1999) (applying Arizona law) (re-
fusing to dismiss abuse of process claim against Milberg Weiss law firm 
based on evidence that the firm used an amended complaint for the 
ulterior purpose of extorting false testimony). 
Massachusetts: Powers v. Leno, 509 N.E.2d 46, 48-49 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1987). The court found that a jury question existed regarding ulterior 
motive, where evidence showed that the party challenging zoning ap-
provals did so to keep the property tied up in litigation until property 
owner agreed to sell him a strip of land "for a buck." Id. In addition, 
an abuse of process issue was raised when the defendant allegedly 
stated, "[a]nd if I don't get what I want, I'll make sure these condo-
miniums are never built. I'll delay it in court forever, even if I have to 
spend one million dollars." Id. 
Michigan: Amway Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., No. 1:98-CV-726, 
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2877, at *5-*8 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 2001) (ap-
plying Michigan law) (denying motion to dismiss abuse of process 
counterclaim that alleged Amway issued subpoenas "for the ulterior 
motive of harassing and intimidating" website operators that publish 
information critical of Amway). 
Montana: Hopper v. Drysdale, 524 F. Supp. 1039, 1042 (D. Mont. 
1981) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment where the 
plaintiff alleged that his deposition in a civil case had been noted for 
the "ulterior motive of having him present in the jurisdiction of Galla-
tin County so that he could be arrested on the outstanding contempt 
order"). 
Nevada: Nev. Credit Rating Bureau, Inc. v. Williams, 503 P.2d 9, 13 
(Nev. 1972). The court found an abuse of process under the follow-
ing circumstances: creditors attached a debtor's property valued at 
over $30,000 to secure a debt of less than $5,000; the property was 
attached in its entirety even though it was divisible; and the creditors 
summarily rejected the debtor's efforts to release parts of the prop-
erty, despite the creditor's full knowledge of the devastating effect of 
the attachment upon the attachee's mining business in which he used 
the attached machinery. Id. 
New Mexico: Richardson v. Rutherford, 787 P.2d 414, 421-22 (N.M. 
1990) (reversing dismissal of claim for abuse of process because a jury 
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could find the ulterior motive behind an excessive ad damnum was to 
"intimidate" the defendant into a settlement). 
New York: Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 
509,515 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (reversing dismissal of abuse of process claim 
because the intentional elements of the tort were clearly satisfied). 
The Avigliano case noted that: 
[The] plaintiffs' purpose in bringing proceedings before ad-
ministrative and judicial tribunals has been to coerce 
Sumitomo into acceding to their demands for work assign-
ments for which they were unqualified and for payment of 
additional compensation to which they were not entitled. 
Such allegations clearly satisfy the intentional elements of 
the tort of abuse of process. 
Id.; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, Lo-
cal 1889, 343 N.E.2d 278,280,283 (N.Y. 1975). The court found that 
the complaint stated a cause of action for abuse of process because it 
alleged that the attorney for the teachers' association issued judicial 
subpoenas duces tecum to eighty-seven teachers in order to compel 
their attendance as witnesses before the public employees' relations 
board. Id. at 280. In doing so, the attorney refused to accept the 
school district's request that a majority of the teachers be excused 
from attendance at the initial hearing date. Id. In addition, the attor-
ney also refused to grant the board's request to stagger the appear-
ances, which resulted in the board having to hire seventy-seven 
substitute teachers to replace the subpoenaed teachers. Id. The court 
held that: 
The subpoenas here were regularly issued process, defend-
ants were motivated by an intent to harass and to injure, and 
the refusal to comply with a reasonable request to stagger the 
appearances was sufficient to support an inference that the 
process was being perverted to inflict economic harm on the 
school district. 
Id. at 283; Station Assocs., Inc. v. Long Island RR Co., 188 N.Y.S.2d 
435, 439-40 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959) (upholding property seller's abuse 
of process claim against a property purchaser under the following cir-
cumstances: (1) the purchaser ran into financial difficulties and aban-
doned its intention to purchase the property; (2) the purchaser 
induced the seller to declare the purchaser in default; (3) the pur-
chaser filed a lis pendens so that the property could not become the 
subject of other sale negotiations; and (4) all of this was done for the 
purpose of coercing a settlement and relieving the purchaser of any 
liability caused by its own abandonment of the contract); Cardy v. 
Maxwell, 169 N.Y.S.2d 547, 550 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957) The court 
found that: 
2002] Abuse of Process 
Threats to give wide publicity to the contents of a complaint, 
in order to coerce and extort payments from the defendant 
in the action, motivated by a desire to escape adverse public-
ity, and the consummation of such threats do not constitute 
a legitimate and proper use of the process of the court. The 
[wife's] action for deceit ... [against her husband was] trans-
formed from its lawful function to an instrument of at-
tempted blackmail and extortion. 
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Id.; Rothbard v. Ringler, 77 N.Y.S.2d 351 (N.Y. App. Div. 1947) (re- . 
jecting motion to dismiss a claim for abuse of process where service of 
a summons and complaint for jail commitment due to alimony arrear-
age was purposefully delayed until the beginning of a Memorial Day 
weekend when the courts would be closed, so that a release from cus-
tody would not be possible until the end of the long holiday week-
end); Dishawv. Wadleigh, 44 N.Y.S. 207, 209-11 (N.Y. App. Div. 1897). 
In Dishaw, the court found that the attorney was liable for abuse of 
process, because he issued a subpoena in a distant part of the State, 
not for the purpose of procuring a witness's attendance and testi-
mony, but rather, for the ulterior purpose of coercing the subpoe-
naed party to pay the claim against him. Id. The attorney reasoned 
that since the claim was small, the other party would not "submit to 
the discomfort, inconvenience, and expense of attending court at so 
great a distance, [and would instead] ... pay the claim." Id. The court 
opined that such trickery and cunning was "degrading to an honora-
ble profession, and well calculated to bring the administration of jus-
tice into reproach and contempt." Id. 
Ohio: Robb v. Chagrin Lagoons Yacht Club, Inc., 662 N.E.2d 9, 15 
(Ohio 1996) (finding facts sufficient to support a claim for abuse of 
process where yacht club members used judicial proceedings to co-
erce other members into dropping club grievances against them; a 
letter to the membership essentially admitted the ulterior motive: "Re-
member, no grievances, the case is dead and you members stop pay-
ing ... VOTE TO DROP THE GRIEVANCES."); see also Black v. 
Pheils, No. WD-98-029, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 5663, at *9 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Dec. 4, 1998) (overruling summary judgment disposing of abuse 
of process claim where affidavits established an "ulterior purpose" to 
saddle opponents with "burdensome and unnecessary litigation ex-
penses for the purpose of denying [them] the ability to improve their 
property") . 
Pennsylvania: Minnesota Corn Processors, Inc. v. McCormick, No. 
99-5932,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9441 at *25-*26 (E.D. Pa.July 6,2000) 
(applying Pennsylvania law) (reversing dismissal of counterclaim for 
abuse of process against litigant that threatened to force its opponent 
into bankruptcy unless he promptly acceded to demands extrinsic to 
the scope of the lawsuit). 
